display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
6 ideas
| 2555 | For Locke knowledge relates to objects, not to propositions [Locke, by Rorty] |
| Full Idea: Locke didn't think of knowledge as true justified belief. …He considered "knowledge of" as prior to "knowledge that", and knowledge as a relation between persons and objects rather than persons and propositions. | |
| From: report of John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694]) by Richard Rorty - Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature 3.2 | |
| A reaction: This seems pretty close to Russell's 'knowledge by acquaintance'. You'd be a in a stronger position to build on this sort of thing if you were a direct realist about perception. |
| 2776 | Externalism could even make belief unnecessary (e.g. in animals) [Dancy,J] |
| Full Idea: One reading of the externalist approach may lead to a rejection of the belief condition for knowledge (in animals, perhaps). | |
| From: Jonathan Dancy (Intro to Contemporary Epistemology [1985], 9.3) | |
| A reaction: At this point the concept of 'knowledge' seems to disperse into the mist. This pushes me to a 'setting the bar high' view of knowledge. Otherwise plants will have it, and we don't want that. |
| 2746 | How can a causal theory of justification show that all men die? [Dancy,J] |
| Full Idea: How can a causal analysis of justification show that I know that all men die? | |
| From: Jonathan Dancy (Intro to Contemporary Epistemology [1985], 2.3) | |
| A reaction: I presume he means that inductive generalisations can't be purely causal. The claim that men are immortal is absurd because it is 'unconnected' to what actually happens. |
| 2747 | Causal theories don't allow for errors in justification [Dancy,J] |
| Full Idea: Causal accounts of justification do not allow for the possibility that a false belief may still be justified. | |
| From: Jonathan Dancy (Intro to Contemporary Epistemology [1985], 2.4) | |
| A reaction: Good. If you switch to what you only think is the cause of your belief, you have gone internalist and ruined the party. You can't deny that a falsehood can be justified, or justification is vacuous. |
| 10326 | Other men's opinions don't add to our knowledge - even when they are true [Locke] |
| Full Idea: The floating of other Mens Opinions in our brains makes us not one jot the more knowing, though they happen to be true. | |
| From: John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 1.04.23) | |
| A reaction: Kusch calls this thought of Locke's 'notorious'. Locke is certainly expressing extreme individualism in epistemology, and Kusch's views are the exact opposite. I'm more with Kusch. |
| 2772 | Coherentism moves us towards a more social, shared view of knowledge [Dancy,J] |
| Full Idea: An advantage of coherentism is that it directs attention away from the individual's struggle to achieve knowledge (the classical conception), and points to knowledge as a social phenomenon, shared, and increased by means of sharing. | |
| From: Jonathan Dancy (Intro to Contemporary Epistemology [1985], 8.3) | |
| A reaction: This is exactly the view which I now embrace. Internal coherence is the basis, but that spills out into the community, and into books, and into the relativity of social acceptance. |