Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM, Sextus Empiricus and John Perry

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17 ideas

13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / b. Need for justification
Fools, infants and madmen may speak truly, but do not know [Sext.Empiricus]
     Full Idea: The fool and the infant and the madman at times say something true, but they do not possess knowledge of the true.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Logicians (two books) [c.180], I.042)
     A reaction: This may be correct of someone who is insane, but seems unfair to the fool and the infant. At what age do children begin to know things? If speech was just random nonsense, an accidental truth seems impossible.
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
Some things are their own criterion, such as straightness, a set of scales, or light [Sext.Empiricus]
     Full Idea: Dogmatists say something can be its own criterion. The straight is the standard of itself, and a set of scales establishes the equality of other things and of itself, and light seems to reveal not just other things but also itself.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Mathematicians [c.180], 442)
     A reaction: Each of these may be a bit dubious, but deserves careful discussion.
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
Madmen are reliable reporters of what appears to them [Sext.Empiricus]
     Full Idea: The madman is a trustworthy criterion of the appearances which occur in madness.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Logicians (two books) [c.180], I.062)
     A reaction: It is hard to conceive of an genuinely insane person deliberately misreporting their hallucinations. They are, of course, the sole witness.
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
The basis of scepticism is the claim that every proposition has an equal opposing proposition [Sext.Empiricus]
     Full Idea: The main basic principle of the sceptic system is that of opposing to every proposition an equal proposition.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], I.12)
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 3. Illusion Scepticism
The necks of doves appear different in colour depending on the angle of viewing [Sext.Empiricus]
     Full Idea: The necks of doves appear different in hue according to the differences in the angle of inclination.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], I.120)
The same oar seems bent in water and straight when out of it [Sext.Empiricus]
     Full Idea: The same oar seems bent when in the water but straight when out of the water.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], I.119)
The same tower appears round from a distance, but square close at hand [Sext.Empiricus]
     Full Idea: The same tower appears round from a distance, but square close at hand.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], I.32)
If we press the side of an eyeball, objects appear a different shape [Sext.Empiricus]
     Full Idea: When we press the eyeball at one side the forms, figures and sizes of the objects appear oblong and narrow.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], I.47)
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
How can sceptics show there is no criterion? Weak without, contradiction with [Sext.Empiricus]
     Full Idea: The dogmatists ask how the sceptic can show there is no criterion. If without a criterion, he is untrustworthy; with a criterion he is turned upside down. He says there is no criterion, but accepts a criterion to establish this.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Mathematicians [c.180], 440)
     A reaction: This is also the classic difficulty for foundationalist views of knowledge. Is the foundation justified, or not?
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 1. Relativism
How can we judge between our impressions and those of other animals, when we ourselves are involved? [Sext.Empiricus]
     Full Idea: We cannot judge between our own impressions and those of other animals, because we ourselves are involved in the dispute.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], I.59)
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 3. Subjectivism
Water that seems lukewarm can seem very hot on inflamed skin [Sext.Empiricus]
     Full Idea: The same water which seems very hot when poured on inflamed spots seems lukewarm to us.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], I.101)
Some actions seem shameful when sober but not when drunk [Sext.Empiricus]
     Full Idea: Actions which seem shameful to us when sober do not seem shameful when drunk.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], I.109)
If we had no hearing or sight, we would assume no sound or sight exists, so there may be unsensed qualities [Sext.Empiricus]
     Full Idea: A man with touch, taste and smell, but no hearing or sight, will assume nothing audible or visible exists, so maybe an apple has qualities which we have no senses to perceive.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], I.96)
Sickness is perfectly natural to the sick, so their natural perceptions should carry some weight [Sext.Empiricus]
     Full Idea: Health is natural for the healthy but unnatural for the sick, and sickness is unnatural for the healthy but natural for the sick, so we must give credence to the natural perceptions of the sick.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], I.103)
If we enjoy different things, presumably we receive different impressions [Sext.Empiricus]
     Full Idea: The enjoyment of different things is an indication that we get varying impressions from the underlying objects.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], I.80)
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 4. Cultural relativism
Even if all known nations agree on a practice, there may be unknown nations which disagree [Sext.Empiricus]
     Full Idea: Even among practices on which all known cultures are agreed, disagreement about them may possibly exist amongst some of the nations which are unknown to us.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.234)
With us it is shameful for men to wear earrings, but among Syrians it is considered noble [Sext.Empiricus]
     Full Idea: It is a shameful thing with us for men to wear earrings, but among some of the barbarians, such as the Syrians, it is a token of nobility.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.203)