display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
3 ideas
| 23641 | People dislike believing without evidence, and try to avoid it [Reid] |
| Full Idea: To believe without evidence is a weakness which every man is concerned to avoid, and which every man wishes to avoid. | |
| From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 2: Senses [1785], 20) | |
| A reaction: It seems to be very common, though, for people to believe things on incredibly flimsy evidence, if they find the belief appealing. This is close to Clifford's Principle, but not quite as dogmatic. |
| 23642 | If non-rational evidence reaches us, it is reason which then makes use of it [Reid] |
| Full Idea: If Nature gives us information of things that concern us, by other means that by reasoning, reason itself will direct us to receive that information with thankfulness, and to make the best use of it. | |
| From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 2: Senses [1785], 20) | |
| A reaction: This is more of a claim than an argument, but it is hard to see how anything could even be seen as evidence if some sort of rational judgement has not been made. The clever detective sees which facts are evidence. |
| 23549 | We treat testimony with a natural trade off of belief and caution [Reid, by Fricker,M] |
| Full Idea: Reid says we naturally operate counterpart principles of veracity and credulity in our testimonial exchanges. | |
| From: report of Thomas Reid (An Enquiry [1764], 6.24) by Miranda Fricker - Epistemic Injustice 1.3 n11 | |
| A reaction: What you would expect from someone who believed in common sense. Fricker contrasts this with Tyler Burge's greater confidence, and then criticises both (with Reid too cautious and Burge over-confident). She defends a 'low-level' critical awareness. |