display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
7 ideas
1870 | The basis of scepticism is the claim that every proposition has an equal opposing proposition [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: The main basic principle of the sceptic system is that of opposing to every proposition an equal proposition. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], I.12) |
1882 | The necks of doves appear different in colour depending on the angle of viewing [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: The necks of doves appear different in hue according to the differences in the angle of inclination. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], I.120) |
1881 | The same oar seems bent in water and straight when out of it [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: The same oar seems bent when in the water but straight when out of the water. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], I.119) |
1872 | The same tower appears round from a distance, but square close at hand [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: The same tower appears round from a distance, but square close at hand. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], I.32) |
1873 | If we press the side of an eyeball, objects appear a different shape [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: When we press the eyeball at one side the forms, figures and sizes of the objects appear oblong and narrow. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], I.47) |
6642 | Psychologists say illusions only occur in unnatural and passive situations [Lowe] |
Full Idea: Psychologists point out that illusions almost always occur in unnatural environments in which subjects are prevented from exploiting the natural interplay between perception and action. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 6) | |
A reaction: It has always struck me that philosophers make a great deal out of illusions, but I don't think I have ever had one. I don't know anyone who has seen a non-existent dagger. |
20794 | How can sceptics show there is no criterion? Weak without, contradiction with [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: The dogmatists ask how the sceptic can show there is no criterion. If without a criterion, he is untrustworthy; with a criterion he is turned upside down. He says there is no criterion, but accepts a criterion to establish this. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Mathematicians [c.180], 440) | |
A reaction: This is also the classic difficulty for foundationalist views of knowledge. Is the foundation justified, or not? |