display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
2 ideas
| 23294 | It is common to doubt truth when discussing it, but totally accept it when discussing knowledge [Davidson] |
| Full Idea: You are following Plato's lead if you worry about the concept of truth when it is the focus of your attention, but you pretend you understand it when trying to cope with knowledge (or belief, memory, perception etc.). | |
| From: Donald Davidson (The Folly of Trying to Define Truth [1999], p.20) | |
| A reaction: Nice to find someone pointing out this absurdity. He says Hume does the same with doubts about the external world, which he ignores when discussing other minds. Belief is holding true; only truths are actually remembered…. |
| 8804 | Reasons for beliefs are not the same as evidence [Davidson] |
| Full Idea: We must find a reason for supposing most of our beliefs are true that is not a form of evidence. | |
| From: Donald Davidson (Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge [1983], p.158) | |
| A reaction: This simple observation strikes me as being a key truth in epistemology. It is the same confusion that creates Jackson's Knowledge Argument (Idea 7377) against physicalism (that experiencing red can be thought to be knowledge). |