Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Anaxarchus, John Greco and James Pryor
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9 ideas
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / b. Need for justification
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19734
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If value is practical, knowledge is no better than true opinion [Greco]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
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8845
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An experience's having propositional content doesn't make it a belief [Pryor]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / e. Pro-foundations
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8842
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The best argument for immediate justification is not the Regress Argument, but considering examples [Pryor]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
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8843
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Impure coherentists accept that perceptions can justify, unlike pure coherentists [Pryor]
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8844
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Coherentism rests on the claim that justifications must be beliefs, with propositional content [Pryor]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism
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8846
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Reasons for beliefs can be cited to others, unlike a raw headache experience [Pryor]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 5. Controlling Beliefs
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8847
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Beliefs are not chosen, but you can seek ways to influence your belief [Pryor]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 10. Anti External Justification
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19733
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Externalist theories don't explain why knowledge has value [Greco]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
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3061
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Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing [Anaxarchus, by Diog. Laertius]
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