Combining Philosophers
Ideas for B Hale / C Wright, Jonathan Kvanvig and Ren Descartes
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24 ideas
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / c. Defeasibility
19567
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The 'defeasibility' approach says true justified belief is knowledge if no undermining facts could be known [Kvanvig]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
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'Access' internalism says responsibility needs access; weaker 'mentalism' needs mental justification [Kvanvig]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 1. Epistemic virtues
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Epistemic virtues: love of knowledge, courage, caution, autonomy, practical wisdom... [Kvanvig]
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19731
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If epistemic virtues are faculties or powers, that doesn't explain propositional knowledge [Kvanvig]
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19732
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The value of good means of attaining truth are swamped by the value of the truth itself [Kvanvig]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
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The method starts with clear intuitions, followed by a process of deduction [Descartes]
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3606
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I was searching for reliable rock under the shifting sand [Descartes]
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To achieve good science we must rebuild from the foundations [Descartes]
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2255
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Only one certainty is needed for progress (like a lever's fulcrum) [Descartes]
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19678
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Strong foundationalism needs strict inferences; weak version has induction, explanation, probability [Kvanvig]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
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We can know basic Principles without further knowledge, but not the other way round [Descartes]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
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Reliabilism cannot assess the justification for propositions we don't believe [Kvanvig]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
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Even if my body and objects are imaginary, there may be simpler things which are true [Descartes]
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6347
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Descartes can't begin again, because sceptics doubt cognitive processes as well as beliefs [Pollock/Cruz on Descartes]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 3. Illusion Scepticism
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If pain is felt in a lost limb, I cannot be certain that a felt pain exists in my real limbs [Descartes]
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3620
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We correct sense errors with other senses, not intellect [Mersenne on Descartes]
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3619
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The senses can only report, so perception errors are in the judgment [Gassendi on Descartes]
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2249
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It is prudent never to trust your senses if they have deceived you even once [Descartes]
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3621
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Only judgement decides which of our senses are reliable [Descartes]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 4. Demon Scepticism
2253
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God may have created nothing, but made his creation appear to me as it does now [Descartes]
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2254
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To achieve full scepticism, I imagine a devil who deceives me about the external world and my own body and senses [Descartes]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 5. Dream Scepticism
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Waking actions are joined by memory to all our other actions, unlike actions of which we dream [Descartes]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
3604
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When rebuilding a house, one needs alternative lodgings [Descartes]
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2294
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I can only sense an object if it is present, and can't fail to sense it when it is [Descartes]
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