Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Benjamin Constant, J Pollock / J Cruz and Ernest Sosa
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15 ideas
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
6353
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People rarely have any basic beliefs, and never enough for good foundations [Pollock/Cruz]
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6361
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Foundationalism requires self-justification, not incorrigibility [Pollock/Cruz]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / c. Empirical foundations
8882
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Perception may involve thin indexical concepts, or thicker perceptual concepts [Sosa]
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8883
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Do beliefs only become foundationally justified if we fully attend to features of our experience? [Sosa]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / d. Rational foundations
8885
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Some features of a thought are known directly, but others must be inferred [Sosa]
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6357
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Reason cannot be an ultimate foundation, because rational justification requires prior beliefs [Pollock/Cruz]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / e. Pro-foundations
8876
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Much propositional knowledge cannot be formulated, as in recognising a face [Sosa]
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8796
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A single belief can trail two regresses, one terminating and one not [Sosa]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
8799
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If mental states are not propositional, they are logically dumb, and cannot be foundations [Sosa]
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8795
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Mental states cannot be foundational if they are not immune to error [Sosa]
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6363
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Foundationalism is wrong, because either all beliefs are prima facie justified, or none are [Pollock/Cruz]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
6365
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Negative coherence theories do not require reasons, so have no regress problem [Pollock/Cruz]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
8879
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Fully comprehensive beliefs may not be knowledge [Sosa]
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6354
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Coherence theories fail, because they can't accommodate perception as the basis of knowledge [Pollock/Cruz]
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6367
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Coherence theories isolate justification from the world [Pollock/Cruz]
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