Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Donald Davidson, Erik J. Olsson and Antonio Gramsci
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13 ideas
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
23294
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It is common to doubt truth when discussing it, but totally accept it when discussing knowledge [Davidson]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
8804
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Reasons for beliefs are not the same as evidence [Davidson]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
8802
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Sensations lack the content to be logical; they cause beliefs, but they cannot justify them [Davidson]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
8801
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Coherent justification says only beliefs can be reasons for holding other beliefs [Davidson]
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21515
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Incoherence may be more important for enquiry than coherence [Olsson]
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21514
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Coherence is the capacity to answer objections [Olsson]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
21496
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Mere agreement of testimonies is not enough to make truth very likely [Olsson]
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21499
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Coherence is only needed if the information sources are not fully reliable [Olsson]
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21502
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A purely coherent theory cannot be true of the world without some contact with the world [Olsson]
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21512
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Extending a system makes it less probable, so extending coherence can't make it more probable [Olsson]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
8805
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Skepticism is false because our utterances agree, because they are caused by the same objects [Davidson]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 2. Knowledge as Convention
10347
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Objectivity is intersubjectivity [Davidson]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 6. Relativism Critique
6398
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Different points of view make sense, but they must be plotted on a common background [Davidson]
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