Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Donald Davidson, Gilbert Harman and Critolaus

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14 ideas

13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
23294 It is common to doubt truth when discussing it, but totally accept it when discussing knowledge [Davidson]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
8804 Reasons for beliefs are not the same as evidence [Davidson]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / b. Pro-externalism
3074 People's reasons for belief are rarely conscious [Harman]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / a. Evidence
3097 We don't distinguish between accepting, and accepting as evidence [Harman]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
8802 Sensations lack the content to be logical; they cause beliefs, but they cannot justify them [Davidson]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
8801 Coherent justification says only beliefs can be reasons for holding other beliefs [Davidson]
6369 In negative coherence theories, beliefs are prima facie justified, and don't need initial reasons [Harman, by Pollock/Cruz]
19311 In revision of belief, we need to keep track of justifications for foundations, but not for coherence [Harman]
19312 Coherence is intelligible connections, especially one element explaining another [Harman]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism
3096 Coherence avoids scepticism, because it doesn't rely on unprovable foundations [Harman]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 8. Social Justification
8800 If you would deny a truth if you know the full evidence, then knowledge has social aspects [Harman, by Sosa]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
8805 Skepticism is false because our utterances agree, because they are caused by the same objects [Davidson]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 2. Knowledge as Convention
10347 Objectivity is intersubjectivity [Davidson]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 6. Relativism Critique
6398 Different points of view make sense, but they must be plotted on a common background [Davidson]