Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Donald Davidson, Robert Fogelin and Daniel Garber

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13 ideas

13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
23294 It is common to doubt truth when discussing it, but totally accept it when discussing knowledge [Davidson]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / c. Defeasibility
6589 Knowledge is legitimate only if all relevant defeaters have been eliminated [Fogelin]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
8804 Reasons for beliefs are not the same as evidence [Davidson]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
8802 Sensations lack the content to be logical; they cause beliefs, but they cannot justify them [Davidson]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
8801 Coherent justification says only beliefs can be reasons for holding other beliefs [Davidson]
6596 For coherentists, circularity is acceptable if the circle is large, rich and coherent [Fogelin]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / a. Contextualism
6597 A rule of justification might be: don't raise the level of scrutiny without a good reason [Fogelin]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 2. Types of Scepticism
6588 Scepticism is cartesian (sceptical scenarios), or Humean (future), or Pyrrhonian (suspend belief) [Fogelin]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
8805 Skepticism is false because our utterances agree, because they are caused by the same objects [Davidson]
6590 Scepticism deals in remote possibilities that are ineliminable and set the standard very high [Fogelin]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 1. Relativism
6583 Radical perspectivism replaces Kant's necessary scheme with many different schemes [Fogelin]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 2. Knowledge as Convention
10347 Objectivity is intersubjectivity [Davidson]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 6. Relativism Critique
6398 Different points of view make sense, but they must be plotted on a common background [Davidson]