Combining Philosophers
Ideas for H.Putnam/P.Oppenheim, Jonathan Kvanvig and J Pollock / J Cruz
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19 ideas
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
6371
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Bayesian epistemology is Bayes' Theorem plus the 'simple rule' (believe P if it is probable) [Pollock/Cruz]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / c. Defeasibility
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The 'defeasibility' approach says true justified belief is knowledge if no undermining facts could be known [Kvanvig]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
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Internalism says if anything external varies, the justifiability of the belief does not vary [Pollock/Cruz]
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19679
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'Access' internalism says responsibility needs access; weaker 'mentalism' needs mental justification [Kvanvig]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 1. Epistemic virtues
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Epistemic virtues: love of knowledge, courage, caution, autonomy, practical wisdom... [Kvanvig]
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19731
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If epistemic virtues are faculties or powers, that doesn't explain propositional knowledge [Kvanvig]
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19732
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The value of good means of attaining truth are swamped by the value of the truth itself [Kvanvig]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
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Strong foundationalism needs strict inferences; weak version has induction, explanation, probability [Kvanvig]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
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People rarely have any basic beliefs, and never enough for good foundations [Pollock/Cruz]
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6361
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Foundationalism requires self-justification, not incorrigibility [Pollock/Cruz]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / d. Rational foundations
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Reason cannot be an ultimate foundation, because rational justification requires prior beliefs [Pollock/Cruz]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
6363
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Foundationalism is wrong, because either all beliefs are prima facie justified, or none are [Pollock/Cruz]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
6365
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Negative coherence theories do not require reasons, so have no regress problem [Pollock/Cruz]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
6354
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Coherence theories fail, because they can't accommodate perception as the basis of knowledge [Pollock/Cruz]
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6367
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Coherence theories isolate justification from the world [Pollock/Cruz]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
6370
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Externalism comes as 'probabilism' (probability of truth) and 'reliabilism' (probability of good cognitive process) [Pollock/Cruz]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 2. Causal Justification
6358
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One belief may cause another, without being the basis for the second belief [Pollock/Cruz]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
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Reliabilism cannot assess the justification for propositions we don't believe [Kvanvig]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
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We can't start our beliefs from scratch, because we wouldn't know where to start [Pollock/Cruz]
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