Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Hermarchus, Gilbert Harman and Alvin Plantinga
expand these ideas
|
start again
|
choose
another area for these philosophers
display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
8 ideas
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / b. Pro-externalism
|
3074
|
People's reasons for belief are rarely conscious [Harman]
|
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / a. Evidence
|
3097
|
We don't distinguish between accepting, and accepting as evidence [Harman]
|
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
|
6369
|
In negative coherence theories, beliefs are prima facie justified, and don't need initial reasons [Harman, by Pollock/Cruz]
|
|
19311
|
In revision of belief, we need to keep track of justifications for foundations, but not for coherence [Harman]
|
|
19312
|
Coherence is intelligible connections, especially one element explaining another [Harman]
|
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism
|
3096
|
Coherence avoids scepticism, because it doesn't rely on unprovable foundations [Harman]
|
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
|
6356
|
Maybe a reliable justification must come from a process working with its 'proper function' [Plantinga, by Pollock/Cruz]
|
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 8. Social Justification
|
8800
|
If you would deny a truth if you know the full evidence, then knowledge has social aspects [Harman, by Sosa]
|