Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Jonathan Dancy, Sextus Empiricus and David S. Oderberg

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33 ideas

13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / b. Need for justification
22759 Fools, infants and madmen may speak truly, but do not know [Sext.Empiricus]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / a. Agrippa's trilemma
2754 Foundations are justified by non-beliefs, or circularly, or they need no justification [Dancy,J]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
2749 For internalists we must actually know that the fact caused the belief [Dancy,J]
2770 Internalists tend to favour coherent justification, but not the coherence theory of truth [Dancy,J]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
2752 Foundationalism requires inferential and non-inferential justification [Dancy,J]
2771 Foundationalists must accept not only the basic beliefs, but also rules of inference for further progress [Dancy,J]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
20795 Some things are their own criterion, such as straightness, a set of scales, or light [Sext.Empiricus]
2756 If basic beliefs can be false, falsehood in non-basic beliefs might by a symptom [Dancy,J]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
2753 Beliefs can only be infallible by having almost no content [Dancy,J]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
2773 Coherentism gives a possible justification of induction, and opposes scepticism [Dancy,J]
2779 Idealists must be coherentists, but coherentists needn't be idealists [Dancy,J]
2786 For coherentists justification and truth are not radically different things [Dancy,J]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism
2767 If it is empirical propositions which have to be coherent, this eliminates coherent fiction [Dancy,J]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
2776 Externalism could even make belief unnecessary (e.g. in animals) [Dancy,J]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 2. Causal Justification
2746 How can a causal theory of justification show that all men die? [Dancy,J]
2747 Causal theories don't allow for errors in justification [Dancy,J]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
22760 Madmen are reliable reporters of what appears to them [Sext.Empiricus]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 8. Social Justification
2772 Coherentism moves us towards a more social, shared view of knowledge [Dancy,J]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
1870 The basis of scepticism is the claim that every proposition has an equal opposing proposition [Sext.Empiricus]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 3. Illusion Scepticism
1882 The necks of doves appear different in colour depending on the angle of viewing [Sext.Empiricus]
1881 The same oar seems bent in water and straight when out of it [Sext.Empiricus]
1872 The same tower appears round from a distance, but square close at hand [Sext.Empiricus]
1873 If we press the side of an eyeball, objects appear a different shape [Sext.Empiricus]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
20794 How can sceptics show there is no criterion? Weak without, contradiction with [Sext.Empiricus]
2743 What is the point of arguing against knowledge, if being right undermines your own argument? [Dancy,J]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 1. Relativism
1874 How can we judge between our impressions and those of other animals, when we ourselves are involved? [Sext.Empiricus]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 3. Subjectivism
1878 Water that seems lukewarm can seem very hot on inflamed skin [Sext.Empiricus]
1880 Some actions seem shameful when sober but not when drunk [Sext.Empiricus]
1877 If we had no hearing or sight, we would assume no sound or sight exists, so there may be unsensed qualities [Sext.Empiricus]
1879 Sickness is perfectly natural to the sick, so their natural perceptions should carry some weight [Sext.Empiricus]
1876 If we enjoy different things, presumably we receive different impressions [Sext.Empiricus]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 4. Cultural relativism
1911 Even if all known nations agree on a practice, there may be unknown nations which disagree [Sext.Empiricus]
1910 With us it is shameful for men to wear earrings, but among Syrians it is considered noble [Sext.Empiricus]