Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Jonathan Kvanvig, Helen Cartwright and Karen Armstrong
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7 ideas
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / c. Defeasibility
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The 'defeasibility' approach says true justified belief is knowledge if no undermining facts could be known [Kvanvig]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
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'Access' internalism says responsibility needs access; weaker 'mentalism' needs mental justification [Kvanvig]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 1. Epistemic virtues
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Epistemic virtues: love of knowledge, courage, caution, autonomy, practical wisdom... [Kvanvig]
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If epistemic virtues are faculties or powers, that doesn't explain propositional knowledge [Kvanvig]
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The value of good means of attaining truth are swamped by the value of the truth itself [Kvanvig]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
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Strong foundationalism needs strict inferences; weak version has induction, explanation, probability [Kvanvig]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
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Reliabilism cannot assess the justification for propositions we don't believe [Kvanvig]
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