Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Jonathan Kvanvig, Helen Cartwright and Michael Williams
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10 ideas
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
3574
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Externalism ignores the social aspect of knowledge [Williams,M]
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3571
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Externalism does not require knowing that you know [Williams,M]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 2. Causal Justification
3567
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How could there be causal relations to mathematical facts? [Williams,M]
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3569
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In the causal theory of knowledge the facts must cause the belief [Williams,M]
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3586
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Only a belief can justify a belief [Williams,M]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
3573
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Externalist reliability refers to a range of conventional conditions [Williams,M]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
19570
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Reliabilism cannot assess the justification for propositions we don't believe [Kvanvig]
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3565
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Sometimes I ought to distrust sources which are actually reliable [Williams,M]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 5. Controlling Beliefs
3566
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We control our beliefs by virtue of how we enquire [Williams,M]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 10. Anti External Justification
8852
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In the context of scepticism, externalism does not seem to be an option [Williams,M]
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