Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Stilpo, Ernest Sosa and Erik J. Olsson
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14 ideas
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / c. Empirical foundations
8882
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Perception may involve thin indexical concepts, or thicker perceptual concepts [Sosa]
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8883
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Do beliefs only become foundationally justified if we fully attend to features of our experience? [Sosa]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / d. Rational foundations
8885
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Some features of a thought are known directly, but others must be inferred [Sosa]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / e. Pro-foundations
8876
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Much propositional knowledge cannot be formulated, as in recognising a face [Sosa]
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8796
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A single belief can trail two regresses, one terminating and one not [Sosa]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
8799
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If mental states are not propositional, they are logically dumb, and cannot be foundations [Sosa]
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8795
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Mental states cannot be foundational if they are not immune to error [Sosa]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
21515
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Incoherence may be more important for enquiry than coherence [Olsson]
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21514
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Coherence is the capacity to answer objections [Olsson]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
8879
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Fully comprehensive beliefs may not be knowledge [Sosa]
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21496
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Mere agreement of testimonies is not enough to make truth very likely [Olsson]
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21499
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Coherence is only needed if the information sources are not fully reliable [Olsson]
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21502
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A purely coherent theory cannot be true of the world without some contact with the world [Olsson]
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21512
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Extending a system makes it less probable, so extending coherence can't make it more probable [Olsson]
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