display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
4 ideas
19000 | Read 'all ravens are black' as about ravens, not as about an implication [Belnap] |
Full Idea: 'All ravens are black' might profitably be read as saying not that being a raven 'implies' being black, but rather something more like 'Consider the ravens: each one is black'. | |
From: Nuel D. Belnap (Conditional Assertion and Restricted Quantification [1970], p.7), quoted by Stephen Yablo - Aboutness 04.5 | |
A reaction: Belnap is more interested in the logic than in the paradox of confirmation, since he evidently thinks that universal generalisations should not be read as implications. I like Belnap's suggestion. |
17897 | Analytic explanation is wholes in terms of parts; synthetic is parts in terms of wholes or contexts [Belnap] |
Full Idea: Throughout the whole texture of philosophy we distinguish two modes of explanation: the analytic mode, which tends to explain wholes in terms of parts, and the synthetic mode, which explains parts in terms of the wholes or contexts in which they occur. | |
From: Nuel D. Belnap (Tonk, Plonk and Plink [1962], p.132) | |
A reaction: The analytic would be bottom-up, and the synthetic would be top-down. I'm inclined to combine them, and say explanation begins with a model, which can then be sliced in either direction, though the bottom looks more interesting. |
13929 | Natural explanations give the causal interconnections [Haslanger] |
Full Idea: Natural explanations work by showing the systematic causal interconnections between things. | |
From: Sally Haslanger (Persistence, Change and Explanation [1989], 7) | |
A reaction: On the whole I love this sort of idea, but I am wondering if this one prevents mathematical or logical explanations from being natural. |
13926 | Best explanations, especially natural ones, need grounding, notably by persistent objects [Haslanger] |
Full Idea: I am not resting my ontology on a simple 'argument to the best explanation'. ..What I want to say is that there are general demands on a kind of explanation, in particular, natural explanation, which require that there are persisting things. | |
From: Sally Haslanger (Persistence, Change and Explanation [1989], 5) | |
A reaction: This is a really nice idea - that best explanation is not just about specific cases, but also about best foundations for explanations in general, which brings in our metaphysics. I defend the role of essences in these best explanations. |