display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
4 ideas
| 11995 | Some peripheral properties are explained by essential ones, but don't themselves explain properties [Kung] |
| Full Idea: There will be demonstrated properties at the edge of the system, so to speak. They will be explained in terms of the essential properties of the basic entities and principles of the science, but will themselves not be explanatory of further properties. | |
| From: Joan Kung (Aristotle on Essence and Explanation [1977], II) | |
| A reaction: This is an important line of thought which needs clarification. We can't glibly say that essences are what explain the other properties. Some properties do more than others to explain subsequent dependent properties. |
| 11996 | Some non-essential properties may explain more than essential-but-peripheral ones do [Kung] |
| Full Idea: It seems highly likely that some non-essential properties may explain more about the individual or about things of his kind than the peripheral properties. | |
| From: Joan Kung (Aristotle on Essence and Explanation [1977], II) | |
| A reaction: Another important issue, if one is defending the explanatory role of essences. It is not only essences which explain. A key question is whether we endorse individual essences as well as generic ones. I think we should. They explain the details. |
| 5363 | If the cat reappears in a new position, presumably it has passed through the intermediate positions [Russell] |
| Full Idea: If the cat appears at one moment in one part of the room, and at another in another part, it is natural to suppose that it has moved from the one to the other, passing over a series of intermediate positions. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 2) | |
| A reaction: This example seems perfect as an illustration of inference to the best explanation (now called 'abduction'), and that seems to me the absolute key to human knowledge. The cat example is what made me a devotee of Bertrand Russell. |
| 5367 | Belief in real objects makes our account of experience simpler and more systematic [Russell] |
| Full Idea: The belief that there are objects corresponding to our sense-data tends to simplify and systematize our account of our experiences, so there seems no good reason for rejecting it. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 2) | |
| A reaction: This hardly counts as a good argument against the logical possibility of global scepticism, but it is a nice statement of the concept of 'best explanation', which obviously requires some sort of rational criteria if it is to provide a theory of knowledge. |