Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Brand Blanshard, Peter Forrest and David Wiggins

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3 ideas

14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
The category of substance is more important for epistemology than for ontology [Wiggins]
     Full Idea: For us the importance of the category of substance, if it has any importance, is not so much ontological as relative to our epistemological circumstances and the conditions under which we have to undertake inquiry.
     From: David Wiggins (Substance [1995], 4.13.2)
     A reaction: This seems to be a rather significant concession. Wiggins has revived the notion of substance in recent times, but he is not quite adding it to the furniture of the world. Personally I increasingly think we can dump it, in ontology and epistemology.
Naming the secondary substance provides a mass of general information [Wiggins]
     Full Idea: Answering 'what is it?' with the secondary substance identifies an object with a class of continuants which survive certain changes, come into being in certain ways, are qualified in certain ways, behave in certain ways, and cease to be in certain ways.
     From: David Wiggins (Substance [1995], 4.3.3)
     A reaction: Thus the priority of this sort of answer is that a huge range of explanations immediately flow from it. I take the explanation to be prior, and the primary substance to be prior, since secondary substance is inductively derived from it.
Asking 'what is it?' nicely points us to the persistence of a continuing entity [Wiggins]
     Full Idea: The special effectiveness of the 'what is it?' question is that, in the case of continuants, it refers us back to our constantly exercised idea of the persistence and life-span of an entity.
     From: David Wiggins (Sameness and Substance Renewed [2001], 2.2)
     A reaction: Compare 'this is a human' with 'this is a member of a family noted for its longevity'. We can't simply answer 'what is it?' by tossing it into the nearest category. I say we need an individual essence for explanation, not just a sortal.