Combining Philosophers

Ideas for H.Putnam/P.Oppenheim, Baruch de Spinoza and Jacques Derrida

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3 ideas

14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / f. Necessity in explanations
To understand a phenomenon, we must understand why it is necessary, not merely contingent [Spinoza, by Cottingham]
     Full Idea: Adequate understanding of a phenomenon, for Spinoza, involves a complete understanding of its causes, and this in turn involves a dissolving of the illusion of contingency and a recognition of the necessity of its being thus and not otherwise.
     From: report of Baruch de Spinoza (The Ethics [1675]) by John Cottingham - The Rationalists p.168
     A reaction: This is the appeal of the rationalist dream. We want a god-like grasp of things, not a superficial perception of what seems to be going on.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
Six reduction levels: groups, lives, cells, molecules, atoms, particles [Putnam/Oppenheim, by Watson]
     Full Idea: There are six 'reductive levels' in science: social groups, (multicellular) living things, cells, molecules, atoms, and elementary particles.
     From: report of H.Putnam/P.Oppenheim (Unity of Science as a Working Hypothesis [1958]) by Peter Watson - Convergence 10 'Intro'
     A reaction: I have the impression that fields are seen as more fundamental that elementary particles. What is the status of the 'laws' that are supposed to govern these things? What is the status of space and time within this picture?
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
To understand the properties we must know the essence, as with a circle [Spinoza]
     Full Idea: If a circle is defined as a figure in which lines from centre to circumference are equal, such definitions do not explain the essence of a circle, but only a property. The properties of a thing are not understood as long as their essences are not known.
     From: Baruch de Spinoza (Improvement of Understanding [1675], §95), quoted by Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J - Substance and Individuation in Leibniz 1.2.1
     A reaction: This is the traditional Aristotelian view of essence, and the example of a circle is nice, though I am not sure what the essence of a circle might be. Presumably ALL the properties of a circle must flow from it.