display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
8 ideas
| 14433 | Mathematically expressed propositions are true of the world, but how to interpret them? [Russell] |
| Full Idea: We know that certain scientific propositions - often expressed in mathematical symbols - are more or less true of the world, but we are very much at sea as to the interpretation to be put upon the terms which occur in these propositions. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], VI) | |
| A reaction: Enter essentialism, say I! Russell's remark is pretty understandable in 1919, but I don't think the situation has changed much. The problem of interpretation may be of more interest to philosophers than to physicists. |
| 5391 | Science aims to find uniformities to which (within the limits of experience) there are no exceptions [Russell] |
| Full Idea: The business of science is to find uniformities, such as the laws of motion and the law of gravitation, to which, so far as our experience extends, there are no exceptions. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 6) | |
| A reaction: This seems nicely stated, based on the Humean 'regularity' view of scientific laws. When we discover such uniformities (such as the gravitational equation), we are still faced with the metaphysical question of their status. Necessity, or pattern? |
| 17631 | Induction is inferring premises from consequences [Russell] |
| Full Idea: The inferring of premises from consequences is the essence of induction. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Regressive Method for Premises in Mathematics [1907], p.274) | |
| A reaction: So induction is just deduction in reverse? Induction is transcendental deduction? Do I deduce the premises from observing a lot of white swans? Hm. |
| 5394 | We can't prove induction from experience without begging the question [Russell] |
| Full Idea: We can never use experience to prove the inductive principle without begging the question. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 6) | |
| A reaction: This highlights why induction is such a big problem for hard-line empiricists, who are reduced to saying that it is a 'dogma', or an unsupported 'natural belief'. And that seems right. All creatures which evolve in a stable universe will do induction. |
| 5390 | Chickens are not very good at induction, and are surprised when their feeder wrings their neck [Russell] |
| Full Idea: The man who has fed his chicken every day throughout its life at last wrings its neck instead, showing that more refined views as to the uniformity of nature would have been useful to the chicken. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 6) | |
| A reaction: A justly famous illustration of Hume's problem of induction, that a vast amount of evidence could still support a false conclusion. If we say 'the future will be like the past', this depends on understanding what was happening in the past. |
| 5392 | It doesn't follow that because the future has always resembled the past, that it always will [Russell] |
| Full Idea: We have experience of past futures, but not of future futures, and the question is: Will future futures resemble past futures? This question is not to be answered by an argument which starts from past futures alone. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 6) | |
| A reaction: This nicely makes the problem of induction unavoidable, for anyone who preferred not to face the problem. The simple solution is to recognise that the future may NOT resemble the past, for all we know. Actually I think it will, but what was the past like? |
| 5363 | If the cat reappears in a new position, presumably it has passed through the intermediate positions [Russell] |
| Full Idea: If the cat appears at one moment in one part of the room, and at another in another part, it is natural to suppose that it has moved from the one to the other, passing over a series of intermediate positions. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 2) | |
| A reaction: This example seems perfect as an illustration of inference to the best explanation (now called 'abduction'), and that seems to me the absolute key to human knowledge. The cat example is what made me a devotee of Bertrand Russell. |
| 5367 | Belief in real objects makes our account of experience simpler and more systematic [Russell] |
| Full Idea: The belief that there are objects corresponding to our sense-data tends to simplify and systematize our account of our experiences, so there seems no good reason for rejecting it. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 2) | |
| A reaction: This hardly counts as a good argument against the logical possibility of global scepticism, but it is a nice statement of the concept of 'best explanation', which obviously requires some sort of rational criteria if it is to provide a theory of knowledge. |