Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Hilary Putnam, Anon (Plat) and Martin Luther

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4 ideas

14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 4. Prediction
Most predictions are uninteresting, and are only sought in order to confirm a theory [Putnam]
     Full Idea: Scientists want successful predictions in order to confirm their theories; they do not want theories in order to obtain the predictions, which are in some cases of not the slightest interest in themselves.
     From: Hilary Putnam (Philosophy of Logic [1971], Ch.8)
     A reaction: Equally, we might only care about the prediction, and have no interest at all in the theory. Farmers want weather predictions, not a PhD in meteorology.
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 2. Aim of Science
Science aims at truth, not at 'simplicity' [Putnam]
     Full Idea: Scientists are not trying to maximise some formal property of 'simplicity'; they are trying to maximise truth.
     From: Hilary Putnam (Explanation and Reference [1973], III B)
     A reaction: This seems to be aimed at the Mill-Ramsey-Lewis account of laws of nature, as the simplest axioms of experience. I'm with Putnam (as he was at this date).
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 3. Instrumentalism
Naïve operationalism would have meanings change every time the tests change [Putnam]
     Full Idea: On a naïve operationalist account every time a new way of testing whether a substance is really gold is discovered, the meaning and reference of 'gold' undergoes a change.
     From: Hilary Putnam (Reason, Truth and History [1981], Ch.2)
14. Science / D. Explanation / 4. Explanation Doubts / a. Explanation as pragmatic
You can't decide which explanations are good if you don't attend to the interest-relative aspects [Putnam]
     Full Idea: Explanation is an interest-relative notion …explanation has to be partly a pragmatic concept. To regard the 'pragmatics' of explanation as no part of the concept is to abdicate the job of figuring out what makes an explanation good.
     From: Hilary Putnam (Meaning and the Moral Sciences [1978], p. 41-2), quoted by David-Hillel Ruben - Explaining Explanation Ch 1
     A reaction: I suppose this is just obvious, depending on how far you want to take the 'interest-relative' bit. If a fool is fobbed off with a trivial explanation, there must be some non-relative criterion for assessing that.