Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Jonathan Dancy, Sextus Empiricus and John Locke

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6 ideas

14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 1. Observation

6026	How can you investigate without some preconception of your object? [Sext.Empiricus]
	Full Idea: A preconception and conception must precede every object of investigation, for how can anyone even investigate without some conception of the object of investigation?
	From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Professors (six books) [c.180], 8.331a)
	A reaction: The Duhem-Quine thesis about the 'theory-ladenness of observation' is just a revival of some routine ancient scepticism. As well as a conceptual scheme to accommodate the observation, there must also be some motivation for the investigation.

14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction

1886	If you don't view every particular, you may miss the one which disproves your universal induction [Sext.Empiricus]
	Full Idea: Induction cannot establish the universal by means of the particular, since limited particulars may omit crucial examples which disprove the universal, and infinite particulars are impossible to know.
	From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], II.204)

14. Science / C. Induction / 6. Bayes's Theorem

2751	Probabilities can only be assessed relative to some evidence [Dancy,J]
	Full Idea: In Probability Calculus probability is only assessed relative to some evidence.
	From: Jonathan Dancy (Intro to Contemporary Epistemology [1985], 4.1)

14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence

16037	Locke seems to use real essence for scientific explanation, and substratum for the being of a thing [Locke, by Jones,J-E]
	Full Idea: It seems that Locke employs the concept of a real essence when he is addressing issues of scientific explanation, and he appeals to substratum when he is discussing the general concept of what it is to be a thing (as opposed to a property or mode).
	From: report of John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694]) by Jan-Erik Jones - Real Essence §4.4
	A reaction: [This idea is attributed to Nicholas Jolley 1999] Locke was, of course, utterly pessimistic about the possibility of knowing real essences. For Aristotle, real essence does both jobs.

16032	To explain qualities, Locke invokes primary and secondary qualities, not real essences [Locke, by Jones,J-E]
	Full Idea: When criticising the scholastic account of the explanation of qualities, Locke typically refrains from invoking real essences, and instead talks about primary, secondary and tertiary qualities.
	From: report of John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 2.08.10-26) by Jan-Erik Jones - Real Essence §2
	A reaction: This is the good empiricists' response to attempts to explain by means of essences - that we must stick to what is 'nearer the surface' and more knowable, only distinguishing which bits match the reality of the object.

12519	Gold is supposed to have a real essence, from whence its detectable properties flow [Locke]
	Full Idea: The ring on my finger is supposed to have a real essence, whereby it is gold, from whence those qualities flow which I find in it, viz. its colour, weight, hardness, fusibility, fixedness, and change of colour upon a slight touch of mercury, etc.
	From: John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 2.31.06)
	A reaction: This is Locke's notion of essence, as simply the underlying cause of the detectable properties. Oderberg says real essences are not hidden, but are the macro-features we all know gold to have. Locke never denies real essences.