Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Paul Audi, A.J. Ayer and Ram Neta

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6 ideas

14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 6. Falsification

19464	We only discard a hypothesis after one failure if it appears likely to keep on failing [Ayer]
	Full Idea: Why should a hypothesis which has failed the test be discarded unless this shows it to be unreliable; that is, having failed once it is likely to fail again? There is no contradiction in a hypothesis that was falsified being more likely to pass in future.
	From: A.J. Ayer (The Problem of Knowledge [1956], 2.viii)
	A reaction: People may become more likely to pass a test after they have failed at the first attempt. Birds which fail to fly at the first attempt usually achieve total mastery of it. There are different types of hypothesis here.

14. Science / C. Induction / 2. Aims of Induction

5190	The induction problem is to prove generalisations about the future based on the past [Ayer]
	Full Idea: The problem of induction is (roughly) finding a way to prove that certain empirical generalisations which are derived from past experience will hold good also in the future.
	From: A.J. Ayer (Language,Truth and Logic [1936], Ch.2)
	A reaction: This doesn't seem to be the only problem. It seems self-evident (since Hume) that you cannot use deductive reasoning to prove that the future will be like the past. In fact, we should obviously be cautious, as things could easily change.

19462	Induction passes from particular facts to other particulars, or to general laws, non-deductively [Ayer]
	Full Idea: Inductive reasoning covers all cases in which we pass from a particular statement of fact, or set of them, to a factual conclusion which they do not formally entail. The inference may be to a general law, or by analogy to another particular instance.
	From: A.J. Ayer (The Problem of Knowledge [1956], 2.viii)
	A reaction: My preferred definition is 'learning from experience' - which I take to be the most rational behaviour you could possibly imagine. I don't think a definition should be couched in terms of 'objects' or 'particulars'.

14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction

5191	We can't use the uniformity of nature to prove induction, as that would be circular [Ayer]
	Full Idea: It is often said that we can justify induction by invoking the uniformity of nature, but that principle merely states (in a misleading fashion) the assumption that past experience is a reliable guide to the future.
	From: A.J. Ayer (Language,Truth and Logic [1936], Ch.2)
	A reaction: That is correct, but it seems to me that if you take the uniformity of nature as a provisional unproven axiom, then induction is an account of how rational creatures cope with the situation. If nature ceases to be uniform, our reason cannot cope.

14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation

17298	Two things being identical (like water and H2O) is not an explanation [Audi,P]
	Full Idea: If there is identity between water and H2O, we have neither the asymmetry nor the irreflexivity that explanations require.
	From: Paul Audi (Clarification and Defense of Grounding [2012], 3.3)
	A reaction: Once you realise it is H2O, you understand its deeper features, which will open up new explanations. He's right, though.

14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations

17299	There are plenty of examples of non-causal explanation [Audi,P]
	Full Idea: There are a number of explanations where it seems clear that causation is not involved at all: normative grounded in non-normative, disposition grounded in categorical, aesthetic grounded in non-aesthetic, semantic in social and psychological.
	From: Paul Audi (Clarification and Defense of Grounding [2012], 3.3)
	A reaction: Apart from dispositions, perhaps, these all seem to be experienced phenomena grounded in the physical world. 'Determination' is the preferred term for non-causal grounding.