Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Stilpo, Nuel D. Belnap and Theodore Sider

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4 ideas

14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem
Two applications of 'grue' do not guarantee a similarity between two things [Sider]
     Full Idea: The applicability of 'grue' to each of a pair of particulars does not guarantee the similarity of those particulars.
     From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 06.2)
     A reaction: Grue is not a colour but a behaviour. If two things are 'mercurial' or 'erratic', will that ensure a similarity at any given moment?
Problem predicates in induction don't reflect the structure of nature [Sider]
     Full Idea: 'Is nonblack', 'is a nonraven', and 'grue' fail to carve at the joints.
     From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 03.3)
     A reaction: A lot more than this needs to said, but this remark encapsulates why I find most of these paradoxes of induction uninteresting. They are all the creations of logicians, rather than of scientists.
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / b. Raven paradox
Read 'all ravens are black' as about ravens, not as about an implication [Belnap]
     Full Idea: 'All ravens are black' might profitably be read as saying not that being a raven 'implies' being black, but rather something more like 'Consider the ravens: each one is black'.
     From: Nuel D. Belnap (Conditional Assertion and Restricted Quantification [1970], p.7), quoted by Stephen Yablo - Aboutness 04.5
     A reaction: Belnap is more interested in the logic than in the paradox of confirmation, since he evidently thinks that universal generalisations should not be read as implications. I like Belnap's suggestion.
14. Science / C. Induction / 6. Bayes's Theorem
Bayes produces weird results if the prior probabilities are bizarre [Sider]
     Full Idea: In the Bayesian approach, bizarre prior probability distributions will result in bizarre responses to evidence.
     From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 03.3)
     A reaction: This is exactly what you find when people with weird beliefs encounter ridiculous evidence for things. It doesn't invalidate the formula, but just says rubbish in rubbish out.