Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Archimedes, Charles Sanders Peirce and Hilary Putnam

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     choose another area for these philosophers

display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers


14 ideas

14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 2. Demonstration
If each inference slightly reduced our certainty, science would soon be in trouble [Peirce]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 4. Prediction
Most predictions are uninteresting, and are only sought in order to confirm a theory [Putnam]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
I classify science by level of abstraction; principles derive from above, and data from below [Peirce]
Duns Scotus offers perhaps the best logic and metaphysics for modern physical science [Peirce]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 2. Aim of Science
Science aims at truth, not at 'simplicity' [Putnam]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 3. Instrumentalism
Naïve operationalism would have meanings change every time the tests change [Putnam]
14. Science / C. Induction / 2. Aims of Induction
'Induction' doesn't capture Greek 'epagoge', which is singulars in a mass producing the general [Peirce]
14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
How does induction get started? [Peirce]
Induction can never prove that laws have no exceptions [Peirce]
The worst fallacy in induction is generalising one recondite property from a sample [Peirce]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / a. Best explanation
'Abduction' is beginning a hypothesis, particularly if it includes preference of one explanation over others [Peirce]
Abduction involves original suggestions, and not just the testing involved in induction [Peirce]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 4. Explanation Doubts / a. Explanation as pragmatic
You can't decide which explanations are good if you don't attend to the interest-relative aspects [Putnam]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 4. Explanation Doubts / b. Rejecting explanation
Men often answer inner 'whys' by treating unconscious instincts as if they were reasons [Peirce]