Combining Philosophers
Ideas for B Hale / C Wright, Peter Lipton and Thomas Hofweber
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51 ideas
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 1. Observation
16851
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The inference to observables and unobservables is almost the same, so why distinguish them? [Lipton]
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14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 2. Demonstration
16799
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Inductive inference is not proof, but weighing evidence and probability [Lipton]
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16798
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We infer from evidence by working out what would explain that evidence [Lipton]
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14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 4. Prediction
16856
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It is more impressive that relativity predicted Mercury's orbit than if it had accommodated it [Lipton]
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16857
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Predictions are best for finding explanations, because mere accommodations can be fudged [Lipton]
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14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
16827
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If we make a hypothesis about data, then a deduction, where does the hypothesis come from? [Lipton]
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14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
16804
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Induction is repetition, instances, deduction, probability or causation [Lipton]
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14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
16823
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Standard induction does not allow for vertical inferences, to some unobservable lower level [Lipton]
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14. Science / C. Induction / 4. Reason in Induction
16800
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An inductive inference is underdetermined, by definition [Lipton]
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16858
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We can argue to support our beliefs, so induction will support induction, for believers in induction [Lipton]
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14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / b. Raven paradox
16832
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If something in ravens makes them black, it may be essential (definitive of ravens) [Lipton]
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16836
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My shoes are not white because they lack some black essence of ravens [Lipton]
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16831
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A theory may explain the blackness of a raven, but say nothing about the whiteness of shoes [Lipton]
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16833
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We can't turn non-black non-ravens into ravens, to test the theory [Lipton]
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16834
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To pick a suitable contrast to ravens, we need a hypothesis about their genes [Lipton]
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14. Science / C. Induction / 6. Bayes's Theorem
16801
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A hypothesis is confirmed if an unlikely prediction comes true [Lipton]
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16839
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Explanation may be an important part of implementing Bayes's Theorem [Lipton]
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16837
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Bayes involves 'prior' probabilities, 'likelihood', 'posterior' probability, and 'conditionalising' [Lipton]
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16803
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Bayes is too liberal, since any logical consequence of a hypothesis confirms it [Lipton]
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16802
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Bayes seems to rule out prior evidence, since that has a probability of one [Lipton]
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14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / a. Explanation
16850
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Explanation may describe induction, but may not show how it justifies, or leads to truth [Lipton]
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14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation
16807
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An explanation gives the reason the phenomenon occurred [Lipton]
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16808
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An explanation is what makes the unfamiliar familiar to us [Lipton]
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16806
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An explanation is what is added to knowledge to yield understanding [Lipton]
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16822
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Seaching for explanations is a good way to discover the structure of the world [Lipton]
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14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / b. Contrastive explanations
16816
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In 'contrastive' explanation there is a fact and a foil - why that fact, rather than this foil? [Lipton]
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16826
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With too many causes, find a suitable 'foil' for contrast, and the field narrows right down [Lipton]
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14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / c. Explanations by coherence
16811
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An explanation unifies a phenomenon with our account of other phenomena [Lipton]
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14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
16810
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Deduction explanation is too easy; any law at all will imply the facts - together with the facts! [Lipton]
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16809
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Good explanations may involve no laws and no deductions [Lipton]
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16829
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We reject deductive explanations if they don't explain, not if the deduction is bad [Lipton]
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14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / f. Necessity in explanations
16812
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An explanation shows why it was necessary that the effect occurred [Lipton]
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14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
16846
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A cause may not be an explanation [Lipton]
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16813
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To explain is to give either the causal history, or the causal mechanism [Lipton]
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16815
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Mathematical and philosophical explanations are not causal [Lipton]
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16849
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Explanations may be easier to find than causes [Lipton]
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16848
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Causal inferences are clearest when we can manipulate things [Lipton]
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14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / i. Explanations by mechanism
16842
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We want to know not just the cause, but how the cause operated [Lipton]
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14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / l. Probabilistic explanations
16840
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To maximise probability, don't go beyond your data [Lipton]
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14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / a. Best explanation
16820
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Finding the 'loveliest' potential explanation links truth to understanding [Lipton]
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16824
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Is Inference to the Best Explanation nothing more than inferring the likeliest cause? [Lipton]
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16817
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Best Explanation as a guide to inference is preferable to best standard explanations [Lipton]
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16818
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The 'likeliest' explanation is the best supported; the 'loveliest' gives the most understanding [Lipton]
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16819
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IBE is inferring that the best potential explanation is the actual explanation [Lipton]
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16828
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IBE is not passive treatment of data, but involves feedback between theory and data search [Lipton]
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16844
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A contrasting difference is the cause if it offers the best explanation [Lipton]
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16853
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We select possible explanations for explanatory reasons, as well as choosing among them [Lipton]
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14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / c. Against best explanation
16821
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Must we only have one explanation, and must all the data be made relevant? [Lipton]
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16838
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Bayesians say best explanations build up an incoherent overall position [Lipton]
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16855
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The best theory is boring: compare 'all planets move elliptically' with 'most of them do' [Lipton]
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16852
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Best explanation can't be a guide to truth, because the truth must precede explanation [Lipton]
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