Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Douglas Lackey, Stuart Glennan and Nelson Goodman
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11 ideas
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 2. Aim of Science
17488
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Empiricist theories are sets of laws, which give explanations and reductions [Glennan]
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14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 3. Instrumentalism
17658
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Users of digital thermometers recognise no temperatures in the gaps [Goodman]
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14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 5. Commensurability
17650
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We lack frames of reference to transform physics, biology and psychology into one another [Goodman]
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14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem
18749
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Goodman argued that the confirmation relation can never be formalised [Goodman, by Horsten/Pettigrew]
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17646
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Goodman showed that every sound inductive argument has an unsound one of the same form [Goodman, by Putnam]
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17655
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Grue and green won't be in the same world, as that would block induction entirely [Goodman]
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14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / i. Explanations by mechanism
17493
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Modern mechanism need parts with spatial, temporal and function facts, and diagrams [Glennan]
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17487
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Mechanistic philosophy of science is an alternative to the empiricist law-based tradition [Glennan]
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17489
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Mechanisms are either systems of parts or sequences of activities [Glennan]
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17490
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17th century mechanists explained everything by the kinetic physical fundamentals [Glennan]
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17491
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Unlike the lawlike approach, mechanistic explanation can allow for exceptions [Glennan]
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