Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Harré,R./Madden,E.H, Anaxagoras and Wesley Salmon

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39 ideas

14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 4. Prediction
13054 Correlations can provide predictions, but only causes can give explanations [Salmon]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
15286 Clavius's Paradox: purely syntactic entailment theories won't explain, because they are too profuse [Harré/Madden]
15283 Simplicity can sort theories out, but still leaves an infinity of possibilities [Harré/Madden]
15316 The powers/natures approach has been so successful (for electricity, magnetism, gravity) it may be universal [Harré/Madden]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 2. Aim of Science
15298 We prefer the theory which explains and predicts the powers and capacities of particulars [Harré/Madden]
15225 Science investigates the nature and constitution of things or substances [Harré/Madden]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 3. Instrumentalism
13067 For the instrumentalists there are no scientific explanations [Salmon]
14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
15255 Conjunctions explain nothing, and so do not give a reason for confidence in inductions [Harré/Madden]
15270 Hume's atomic events makes properties independent, and leads to problems with induction [Harré/Madden]
14. Science / C. Induction / 4. Reason in Induction
13055 Good induction needs 'total evidence' - the absence at the time of any undermining evidence [Salmon]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / b. Raven paradox
15284 Contraposition may be equivalent in truth, but not true in nature, because of irrelevant predicates [Harré/Madden]
15285 The items put forward by the contraposition belong within different natural clusters [Harré/Madden]
15287 The possibility that all ravens are black is a law depends on a mechanism producing the blackness [Harré/Madden]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation
13046 Scientific explanation is not reducing the unfamiliar to the familiar [Salmon]
15306 Only changes require explanation [Harré/Madden]
13058 Why-questions can seek evidence as well as explanation [Salmon]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / c. Direction of explanation
15293 If explanation is by entailment, that lacks a causal direction, unlike natural necessity [Harré/Madden]
15294 Powers can explain the direction of causality, and make it a natural necessity [Harré/Madden]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
13050 The 'inferential' conception is that all scientific explanations are arguments [Salmon]
13059 Ontic explanations can be facts, or reports of facts [Salmon]
14366 An explanation is a table of statistical information [Salmon, by Strevens]
13064 The three basic conceptions of scientific explanation are modal, epistemic, and ontic [Salmon]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
13049 We must distinguish true laws because they (unlike accidental generalizations) explain things [Salmon]
13051 Deductive-nomological explanations will predict, and their predictions will explain [Salmon]
13053 A law is not enough for explanation - we need information about what makes a difference [Salmon]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
13061 Flagpoles explain shadows, and not vice versa, because of temporal ordering [Salmon]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / i. Explanations by mechanism
17093 Causation produces productive mechanisms; to understand the world, understand these mechanisms [Salmon]
17492 Salmon's interaction mechanisms needn't be regular, or involving any systems [Glennan on Salmon]
13045 Explanation at the quantum level will probably be by entirely new mechanisms [Salmon]
13062 Does an item have a function the first time it occurs? [Salmon]
13063 Explanations reveal the mechanisms which produce the facts [Salmon]
16557 Salmon's mechanisms are processes and interactions, involving marks, or conserved quantities [Salmon, by Machamer/Darden/Craver]
15254 If the nature of particulars explains their powers, it also explains their relations and behaviour [Harré/Madden]
15317 Powers and natures lead us to hypothesise underlying mechanisms, which may be real [Harré/Madden]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
15310 Solidity comes from the power of repulsion, and shape from the power of attraction [Harré/Madden]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
15219 Essence explains passive capacities as well as active powers [Harré/Madden]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / l. Probabilistic explanations
13060 Can events whose probabilities are low be explained? [Salmon]
13056 Statistical explanation needs relevance, not high probability [Salmon]
13057 Think of probabilities in terms of propensities rather than frequencies [Salmon]