Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Michael Burke, Peter Lipton and David Hildebrand

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14 ideas

14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
16804 Induction is repetition, instances, deduction, probability or causation [Lipton]
14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
16823 Standard induction does not allow for vertical inferences, to some unobservable lower level [Lipton]
14. Science / C. Induction / 4. Reason in Induction
16858 We can argue to support our beliefs, so induction will support induction, for believers in induction [Lipton]
16800 An inductive inference is underdetermined, by definition [Lipton]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / b. Raven paradox
16832 If something in ravens makes them black, it may be essential (definitive of ravens) [Lipton]
16836 My shoes are not white because they lack some black essence of ravens [Lipton]
16831 A theory may explain the blackness of a raven, but say nothing about the whiteness of shoes [Lipton]
16833 We can't turn non-black non-ravens into ravens, to test the theory [Lipton]
16834 To pick a suitable contrast to ravens, we need a hypothesis about their genes [Lipton]
14. Science / C. Induction / 6. Bayes's Theorem
16801 A hypothesis is confirmed if an unlikely prediction comes true [Lipton]
16802 Bayes seems to rule out prior evidence, since that has a probability of one [Lipton]
16803 Bayes is too liberal, since any logical consequence of a hypothesis confirms it [Lipton]
16837 Bayes involves 'prior' probabilities, 'likelihood', 'posterior' probability, and 'conditionalising' [Lipton]
16839 Explanation may be an important part of implementing Bayes's Theorem [Lipton]