Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Stilpo, Peter Lipton and Joan Kung
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14 ideas
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
16804
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Induction is repetition, instances, deduction, probability or causation [Lipton]
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14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
16823
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Standard induction does not allow for vertical inferences, to some unobservable lower level [Lipton]
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14. Science / C. Induction / 4. Reason in Induction
16800
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An inductive inference is underdetermined, by definition [Lipton]
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16858
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We can argue to support our beliefs, so induction will support induction, for believers in induction [Lipton]
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14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / b. Raven paradox
16832
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If something in ravens makes them black, it may be essential (definitive of ravens) [Lipton]
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16836
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My shoes are not white because they lack some black essence of ravens [Lipton]
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16831
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A theory may explain the blackness of a raven, but say nothing about the whiteness of shoes [Lipton]
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16833
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We can't turn non-black non-ravens into ravens, to test the theory [Lipton]
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16834
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To pick a suitable contrast to ravens, we need a hypothesis about their genes [Lipton]
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14. Science / C. Induction / 6. Bayes's Theorem
16802
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Bayes seems to rule out prior evidence, since that has a probability of one [Lipton]
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16801
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A hypothesis is confirmed if an unlikely prediction comes true [Lipton]
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16803
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Bayes is too liberal, since any logical consequence of a hypothesis confirms it [Lipton]
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16837
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Bayes involves 'prior' probabilities, 'likelihood', 'posterior' probability, and 'conditionalising' [Lipton]
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16839
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Explanation may be an important part of implementing Bayes's Theorem [Lipton]
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