display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
4 ideas
4887 | We try to cause other things to occur by causing mental events to occur [Perry] |
Full Idea: We try to cause other things to occur by causing mental events to occur. | |
From: John Perry (Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness [2001], §2.4) | |
A reaction: A small and obvious, but important, point. Mental causation isn't just thoughts leading to physical happenings. Here Perry means that events can be designed to cause thoughts, such as a threatening letter. Not much room for epiphenomenalism here. |
4884 | Brain states must be in my head, and yet the pain seems to be in my hand [Perry] |
Full Idea: The brain state will involve certain parts of the brain, whereas my feeling of pain seems to be located in my hand insofar as it has a bodily location. | |
From: John Perry (Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness [2001], §1.2) | |
A reaction: This seems important to me. The brain is a ventriloquist. Perry implies that pain is quasi-disembodied, but it isn't, it is just experienced as IN the hand. Perhaps it is in the hand? Cutting the nerves loses contact with the pain. |
4921 | Quantum states in microtubules could bind brain activity to produce consciousness [Penrose] |
Full Idea: I propose that microtubules in nerve cells could give rise to a stable quantum state that would bind the activity of brain cells throughout the cerebrum and in doing so give rise to consciousness. | |
From: Roger Penrose (Could a computer ever understand? [1998], p.329) | |
A reaction: This seems to offer a physical theory to account for the 'unity' of the mind (which so impressed Descartes), but I don't quite see why being aware of things would ensue from some 'quantum binding'. I daresay 'quantum binding' occurs in the Sun. |
4888 | It seems plausible that many animals have experiences without knowing about them [Perry] |
Full Idea: It seems quite plausible to me that many animals have experiences without knowing about them. | |
From: John Perry (Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness [2001], §3.1) | |
A reaction: I agree, which makes us acknowledge levels of consciousness, which probably applies to human experience as well. The simplest idea is to distinguish between experiences which involve concepts, and those which don't. Animals sometimes appear surprised. |