display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
3 ideas
24005 | We know other's emotions by explanation, contagion, empathy, imagination, or sympathy [Goldie] |
Full Idea: We know others' emotions by 1) understanding and explaining them, 2) emotional contagion, 3) empathy, 4) in-his-shoes imagining, and 5) sympathy. | |
From: Peter Goldie (The Emotions [2000], 7 Intro) | |
A reaction: He says these must be clearly distinguished, because they are often confused. In-his-shoes is 'me in their position', where empathy is how the position is just for them. The Simulationist approach likes these two. Sympathy need not share the feelings. |
24006 | Empathy and imagining don't ensure sympathy, and sympathy doesn't need them [Goldie] |
Full Idea: Empathy and in-his-shoes imagining are not sufficient for sympathy. Nor are they necessary. You can even sympathise with another when these are impossible, with the sufferings of a whale or a dog, for example. | |
From: Peter Goldie (The Emotions [2000], 7 'Sympathy') | |
A reaction: Goldie is right that these distinct faculties are a blurred muddle in most of our accounts of dealing with other people. Empathy with a whale in not actually impossible, because we recognise their suffering, and we understand suffering. |
15868 | Idealisation idealises all of a thing's properties, but abstraction leaves some of them out [Harré] |
Full Idea: An 'idealisation' preserves all the properties of the source but it possesses these properties in some ideal or perfect form. ...An 'abstraction', on the other hand, lacks certain features of its source. | |
From: Rom Harré (Laws of Nature [1993], 1) | |
A reaction: Yet another example in contemporary philosophy of a clear understanding of the sort of abstraction which Geach and others have poured scorn on. |