display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
2 ideas
7091 | The argument from analogy is not a strong inference, since the other being might be an actor or a robot [Grayling] |
Full Idea: The argument from analogy is a weak one, because it does not logically guarantee the inference I draw to the other's inner states, for he might be dissimulating or acting, or may even be a cleverly contrived robot which feels nothing. | |
From: A.C. Grayling (Wittgenstein [1988], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: This gives the impression that for an argument to be strong it must logically guarantee its inference. It strikes me that analogy is a good reason for believing in other minds, but that is because I am looking for the best explanation, not logical proof. |
15301 | The very concepts of a particular power or nature imply the possibility of being generalised [Harré/Madden] |
Full Idea: The concepts of power, capacity and the nature of a particular involve generalisations and hence already presuppose that there are grounds for extrapolation. | |
From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 8.V) | |
A reaction: I take sortal essentialism to be a serious misundertanding, but the mistake needs to be explained, and this idea is helpful towards that. I think the problem resides in the nature of the language we need to describe particulars. |