display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
16 ideas
| 1714 | Mind involves movement, perception, incorporeality [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The soul seems to be universally defined by three features, so to speak, the production of movement, perception and incorporeality. | |
| From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 405b12) | |
| A reaction: 'Incorporeality' begs the question, but its appearance is a phenomenon that needs explaining. 'Movement' is an interesting Greek view. Nowadays we would presumably added intentional states, and the contents and meaning of thoughts. No 'reason'? |
| 5146 | Everything that receives nourishment has a vegetative soul, with it own distinctive excellence [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: One can assume a vegetative part of the soul in everything that receives nourishment, even in embryos; thus the excellence of this faculty is common and not confined to man; ...because of its nature it has no part in human goodness. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1102a33) | |
| A reaction: Presumably the excellences of this part of the soul would be strength, health and appropriate size. If plants have psuché, then neither 'soul' nor 'mind' seem very good translations. 'Vitality' seems a possibility - humans having it in a conscious form. |
| 5147 | In a controlled person the receptive part of the soul is obedient, and it is in harmony in the virtuous [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: One element of the soul is irrational but receptive to reason; it struggles and strains against reason. ...In the continent (controlled) man it is obedient to reason, and is more amenable in the virtuous man, as it is in harmony with rational principle. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1102b16) | |
| A reaction: The very core of Aristotle's theory, with an image of psychic harmony derived from Plato (who likens in to a well-tuned musical instrument). Aristotle's merely controlled man ('enkrateia') sounds like Kant's truly moral man, following duty. |
| 5148 | The irrational psuché is persuadable by reason - shown by our criticism and encouragement of people [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: That the irrational part of the psuché is in some way persuaded by reason is indicated by our use of admonition, and of reproof and encouragement of all kinds. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1102b33) | |
| A reaction: These attempts to influence people include disapproval of people's feelings, as well as their principles, or their interpretation of the facts. This doesn't prove that feelings can be changed, but it certainly shows that we sometimes want to change them. |
| 5232 | If beings are dominated by appetite, this can increase so much that it drives out reason [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: In an irrational being the appetite for what gives it pleasure is insatiable and indiscriminate, and the exercise of the desire increases its innate tendency; and if these appetites are strong and violent, they actually drive out reason. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1119b09) | |
| A reaction: The end-result of this would be a person Aristotle describes as 'brutish'. The remark seems significant because, even though man is essentially a 'rational animal' (man's 'proper function'), it is actually possible to annihilate our reason. |
| 5507 | Aristotle led to the view that there are several souls, all somewhat physical [Aristotle, by Martin/Barresi] |
| Full Idea: On the later views inspired by Aristotle's 'De Anima' there was no longer just one soul, but several, and each of them had a great deal in common with the body. | |
| From: report of Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE]) by R Martin / J Barresi - Introduction to 'Personal Identity' p.17 | |
| A reaction: Is this based on the faculties of sophia, episteme, nous, techne and phronesis, or is it based on the vegetative, appetitive and rational parts? The latter, I presume. Not so interesting, not so modular. |
| 24051 | Soul is seen as what moves, or what is least physical, or a combination of elements [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Three ways have been handed down in which people define the soul: what is most capable of moving things, since it moves itself; or a body which is the most fine-grained and least corporeal; or that it is composed of the elements. | |
| From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 409b19) | |
| A reaction: A nice example of Aristotle beginning an investigation by idenfying the main explanations which have been 'handed down' from previous generations. These three aren't really in competition, and might all be true. |
| 12086 | Psuché is the form and actuality of a body which potentially has life [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Soul is substance as the form of a natural body which potentially has life, and since this substance is actuality, soul will be the actuality of such a body. | |
| From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 412a20) | |
| A reaction: To understand what Aristotle means by 'form' you must, I'm afraid, read the 'Metaphysics'. Form isn't shape, but rather the essence which bestows the individual identity on the thing. 'Psuche is the essence of man' might be a better slogan. |
| 16754 | The soul is the cause or source of movement, the essence of body, and its end [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The soul is the cause [aitia] of its body alike in three senses which we explicitly recognise. It is (a) the source or origin of movement, it is (b) the end, and it is (c) the essence of the whole living body. | |
| From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 415b09) | |
| A reaction: 'Aitia' also means explanation, so these are three ways to explain a human being, by what it does, why what it is for, and by what it intrinsically is. Activity, purpose and nature. |
| 24046 | Understanding is impossible, if it involves the understanding having parts [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: How could a spatial understanding understand anything? Wiil it do so with parts, seen as magnitudes or as points? If it is points, the understanding will never get through them all. If magnitudes, it will understand things an unlimited number of times. | |
| From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 407a09) | |
| A reaction: This seems to be a strong commitment to the idea that the mind is not physical because it is necessarily non-spatial. |
| 5145 | The rational and irrational parts of the soul are either truly separate, or merely described that way [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The rational and irrational parts of the soul are either separate like parts of the body, or are distinguishable only in definition and thought, like the convex and concave aspects of the circumference of a circle. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1102a27) | |
| A reaction: Whether or not the soul is unified was a clear issue for Aristotle, explored further in De Anima (408a15 and 411b10). He appears to say the soul is not a unity, thus disagreeing with Descartes (Med. 6). |
| 1717 | If the soul is composed of many physical parts, it can't be a true unity [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: If the soul is composed of parts of the body, or the harmony of the elements composing the body, there will be many souls, and everywhere in the body. | |
| From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 408a15) | |
| A reaction: We will ignore "everywhere in the body", but the rest seems to me exactly right. The idea of the unity of the soul is an understandable and convenient assumption, but it leads to all sorts of confusion. A crowd remains unified if half its members leave. |
| 24053 | If a soul have parts, what unites them? [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: What is it that holds the soul together, if it by nature has parts? For surely it cannot be the body. For it seems on the contrary that it is rather the soul that holds the body together? | |
| From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 411b05) | |
| A reaction: This is the hylomorphic view of a human, that the soul is the form that give unity to the matter. To do the job, presumably the form or soul need an intrinsic unity of its own, and hence cannot have parts. Apart from the need for unifying glue. |
| 1721 | What unifies the soul would have to be a super-soul, which seems absurd [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: If soul has parts, what holds them together? Not body, because that is united by soul. If a thing unifies the soul, then THAT is the soul (unless it too has parts, which would lead to an infinite regress). Best to say the soul is a unity. | |
| From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 411b10) | |
| A reaction: You don't need a 'thing' to unify something (like a crowd). I say the body holds the soul together, not physically, but because the body's value permeates thought. The body is the focused interest of the soul, like parents kept together by their child. |
| 1735 | In a way the soul is everything which exists, through its perceptions and thoughts [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The soul is in a way all the things that exist, for all the things that exist are objects either of perception or of thought. | |
| From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 431b20) | |
| A reaction: Sounds very like Berkeley's empirical version of idealism. It also seems to imply modern externalist (anti-individualist) understandings of the mind (which strike me as false). |
| 23218 | The brain has no responsibility for sensations, which occur in the heart [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: And of course, the brain is not responsible for any of the sensations at all. The correct view is that the seat and source of sensation is the region of the heart. | |
| From: Aristotle (The Parts of Animals [c.345 BCE]), quoted by Matthew Cobb - The Idea of the Brain 1 | |
| A reaction: [Need a reference] Hippocrates's assertion a century earlier made no impression on the great man. I wish he had been a little more circumspect with his own view. |