Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Herodotus, Peter E. Pormann and Thomas Aquinas

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8 ideas

15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 1. Faculties

22107	Sensations are transmitted to 'internal senses' in the brain, chiefly to 'phantasia' and 'imagination' [Aquinas, by Kretzmann/Stump]
	Full Idea: Sensory species received in external senses are transmitted to 'internal senses', organs located in the brain. The most important of these for cognition are 'phantasia' and 'imagination' (part of phantasia), which produce and preserve 'phantasms'.
	From: report of Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265]) by Kretzmann/Stump - Aquinas, Thomas 11
	A reaction: This seems to make Aquinas a representative realist. I add this to my portfolio of philosophical faculties - those required by philosophy, rather than by psychology or neuroscience.

15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 2. Imagination

9098	Mental activity combines what we sense with imagination of what is not present [Aquinas]
	Full Idea: Mental activity combines two activities which in the senses are distinct: exterior perception in which we are simply affected by what we sense, and interior imagination in which we create images of things that are not, and never have been present.
	From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ch.5 Q85.2)
	A reaction: Geach cites this thought to show that he is anti-abstractionist, since mind creates images, and these can arise from things which have not been experienced. Any defence of abstractionism must allow an active power to imagination.

15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind

9092	Abstracting A from B generates truth, as long as the connection is not denied [Aquinas]
	Full Idea: Abstacting A from B can mean denying A's connection with B, or simply thinking A without thinking B. Abstracting what in reality is connected generates falsehood if done the first way, but not if done the second.
	From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ch.5 Q85.1)
	A reaction: Despite Geach's denials, this seems to make Aquinas a classic abstractionist. He goes on to distinguish two sorts of abstraction, but he certainly thinks of abstraction from sense experience as a revelation about the nature of reality.

15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind

9093	We understand the general nature of things by ignoring individual peculiarities [Aquinas]
	Full Idea: If we think what defines a stone, man or horse, without thinking of any individual peculiarities it may have, this is precisely what we do when we abstract the general nature of what we understand from any particular way in which we imagine it.
	From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ch.5 Q85.1)
	A reaction: This may not be simple abstraction from sense experience, since there would obviously be a threatened circularity in the process. Do you need to know the essential definition first, in order to discard the individual peculiarities?

9097	The mind abstracts generalities from images, but also uses images for understanding [Aquinas]
	Full Idea: Our mind both abstracts the species from images when it attends to the general nature of things, and understand the species in the images when it has recourse to the images in order to understand the things whose species it has abstracted.
	From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ch.5 Q85.1)
	A reaction: Geach claims that the second half of this idea means that Aquinas is not an abstractionist, but he seems to be explictly abstractionist about the way in which we create higher level concepts from lower ones.

9095	Very general ideas (being, oneness, potentiality) can be abstracted from thought matter in general [Aquinas]
	Full Idea: There are even things we can abstract from thought matter in general, things like being and oneness and potentiality and realization.
	From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ch.5 Q85.1)
	A reaction: The Aristotelian 'potentiality' means possibility, which means that modality is understood by abstraction. Aquinas seems to have four levels: particular perceived, general perceived, particular thought, and general thought. This is the highest level.

9099	Particular instances come first, and (pace Plato) generalisations are abstracted from them [Aquinas]
	Full Idea: The generality attaching to a nature - its relatedness to many particular instances - results from abstraction, so in this sense a generalized nature presupposes its instances, and does not, as Plato thought, precede them.
	From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ch.5 Q85.2)
	A reaction: This seems to be a quite explicit endorsement of abstractionism by Aquinas, despite all Geach's assertions to the contrary.

10508	Species are abstracted from appearances by ignoring individual conditions [Aquinas]
	Full Idea: The agent intellect abstracts intelligible species from phantasms insofar as through the power of the agent intellect we can take into our consideration the natures of the species without the individual conditions.
	From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Q85 Ad4)
	A reaction: There might be a threatened circularity here, in trying to decide which features to ignore and which to retain. If we saw a hundred horses with a white nose blaze, we still wouldn't be sure that this was essential to a horse. Innate notions of species??