Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Herodotus, Rod Girle and David Lewis

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3 ideas

15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / b. Purpose of mind
A mind is an organ of representation [Lewis]
     Full Idea: A mind is an organ of representation.
     From: David Lewis (Lewis: reduction of mind (on himself) [1994], p.421)
     A reaction: This does not seem to necessarily involve awareness, so it seems to put intentionality at the centre of things. It is a good slogan.
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / a. Nature of qualia
Part of the folk concept of qualia is what makes recognition and comparison possible [Lewis]
     Full Idea: The concept of qualia (a part of the folk concept) is the concept of properties of experiences apt for causing abilities to recognize and to imagine experiences of the same type.
     From: David Lewis (Should a materialist believe in qualia? [1995], p.327)
     A reaction: I presume the other part of the folk concept would be what it is about qualia that makes this possible, namely that they 'look/sound/feel.. the same'. Lewis emphasises the functional aspect, which could not possibly be the whole story.
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
Maybe abstraction is just mereological subtraction [Lewis]
     Full Idea: We could say that abstraction is just mereological subtraction of universals.
     From: David Lewis (Against Structural Universals [1986], 'Uninstantiated')
     A reaction: This only works, of course, for the theories that complex universals have simpler universals as 'parts'. This is just a passing surmise. I take it that abstraction only works for a thing whose unity survives the abstraction.