display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
13 ideas
4833 | The human mind is the very idea or knowledge of the human body [Spinoza] |
Full Idea: The human mind is the very idea or knowledge of the human body. | |
From: Baruch de Spinoza (The Ethics [1675], II Pr 19) | |
A reaction: This is close to Aristotle's claim that the 'psuché' is the 'form' of the body. Spinoza is appealingly modern in his view. The mapping of the body (our prioprioceptic sense) strikes me as central to the nature of the mind. |
16198 | Knowledge is the essence of the mind [Spinoza] |
Full Idea: The essence of our mind consists solely in knowledge. | |
From: Baruch de Spinoza (The Ethics [1675], V Pr 36 n) | |
A reaction: This is in a context of discussing the human relation to God. See Keith Hossack's 'The Metaphysics of Knowledge' for an exploration of this idea. (@BenedictSpinoza came up with this one) |
17196 | The will is not a desire, but the faculty of affirming what is true or false [Spinoza] |
Full Idea: By the will I understand a faculty of affirming or denying, but not a desire; a faculty, I say, by which the mind affirms or denies that which is true or false. | |
From: Baruch de Spinoza (The Ethics [1675], II Pr 48) | |
A reaction: This is to be compared with the empiricist tendency to say that there are nothing but desires. On the whole I'm with Spinoza here. Hobbes thinKs of actions in the world, but Spinoza sees the will as operating in the process of reasoning. |
17198 | Will and intellect are the same thing [Spinoza] |
Full Idea: The will and the intellect are one and the same. | |
From: Baruch de Spinoza (The Ethics [1675], II Pr 49) |
17201 | The will is finite, but the intellect is infinite [Spinoza] |
Full Idea: The will is distinguished from the intellect, the latter being finite, the former infinite. | |
From: Baruch de Spinoza (The Ethics [1675], II Pr 49) |
21805 | Spinoza held that the mind is just a bundle of ideas [Spinoza, by Schmid] |
Full Idea: Spinoza held a bundle theory of the mind, according to which our mind is but a bundle 'composed of a great many ideas'. | |
From: report of Baruch de Spinoza (The Ethics [1675], II Pr 15) by Stephan Schmid - Faculties in Early Modern Philosophy 3 | |
A reaction: This seems to imply that the mind lacks unity, and also lacks a Self. Spinoza doesn't say much about this view. |
17204 | Animals are often observed to be wiser than people [Spinoza] |
Full Idea: Many things are observed in brutes which far surpass human sagacity. | |
From: Baruch de Spinoza (The Ethics [1675], III Pr 02) | |
A reaction: Lovely - especially in an age when animals were being actively downgraded (e.g. by Descartes) in order to upgrade man. |
17212 | To understand is the absolute virtue of the mind [Spinoza] |
Full Idea: To understand is the absolute virtue of the mind. | |
From: Baruch de Spinoza (The Ethics [1675], IV Pr 28) | |
A reaction: A possible epigraph for this website. Perhaps it should be required by law that this be printed on the frontispiece of every philosophy book ever published. |
21804 | Faculties are either fictions, or the abstract universals of ideas [Spinoza] |
Full Idea: Faculties are either complete fictions, or nothing but metaphysical beings or universals, which are used to forming from particulars (as 'stoneness' is to a stone). | |
From: Baruch de Spinoza (The Ethics [1675], II Pr 48S), quoted by Stephan Schmid - Faculties in Early Modern Philosophy 3 | |
A reaction: So they are, at best, the sources of our concepts. Does that mean one faculty for each concept, or one huge concept-generating faculty? |
4832 | If the body is affected by two things together, the imagining of one will conjure up the other [Spinoza] |
Full Idea: If the human body has once been affected by two or more bodies at the same time, when the mind afterwards imagines any of them, it will straightway remember the other also. | |
From: Baruch de Spinoza (The Ethics [1675], II Pr 18) | |
A reaction: Very interesting to see a great rationalist philosopher making an observation right at the heart of Hume's theory of knowledge (associationism). Clearly an associationist theory of psychology need not imply a materialist (connectionist) theory of mind. |
21869 | Our own force of persevering is nothing in comparison with external forces [Spinoza] |
Full Idea: The force by which a man perserveres in existing is limited, and infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes. | |
From: Baruch de Spinoza (The Ethics [1675], IV Pr 03) | |
A reaction: This states the obvious, but is important as a way of viewing things. I think Nietzsche's notion of Will to Power comes in here, as a unified account of both forces. |
20307 | As far as possible, everything tries to persevere [Spinoza] |
Full Idea: Each thing, as far as it can by its own power, strives to persevere in its own being. ...[7] The striving by which each thing strives to persevere in its being is nothing but the actual essence of the thing. | |
From: Baruch de Spinoza (The Ethics [1675], III Pr 06) | |
A reaction: This is covered by his word 'conatus'. Obviously this covers plants as well as sentient beings. Mountains have no power to persevere. Since Spinoza sees this as basic, he is not far from Nietzsche. |
21803 | The conatus (striving) of mind and body together is appetite, which is the essence of man [Spinoza] |
Full Idea: When striving [conatus] is related to the Mind it is called Will, but when related to the Mind and Body it is called Appetite. This Appetite is the essence of man, from whose nature there necessarily follow those things that promote this preservation. | |
From: Baruch de Spinoza (The Ethics [1675], III Pr 09S), quoted by Stephan Schmid - Faculties in Early Modern Philosophy 3 | |
A reaction: Spinoza seems to see 'conatus' as a fairly unified thing, where Nietzsche sees the will to power as a combination of many competing 'drives'. I think Nietzsche is closer to the truth. |