display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
5 ideas
| 5034 | Mind is a thinking substance which can know God and eternal truths [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: Minds are substances which think, and are capable of knowing God and of discovering eternal truths. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Antoine Arnauld [1686], 1687.10.09) | |
| A reaction: 'God' is there because the ability to grasp the ontological argument is seen as basic. Note a firm commitment to substance-dualism, and a rationalist commitment to the spotting of necessary truths as basic. He is not totally wrong. |
| 5045 | No machine or mere organised matter could have a unified self [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: By means of the soul or form, there is a true unity which is called the 'I' in us; a thing which could not occur in artificial machines, nor in the simple mass of matter, however organised it may be. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (New System and Explanation of New System [1696], p.120) | |
| A reaction: I think the unity of consciousness and the unified Self are different phenomena. A wonderful remark about artificial intelligence for 1696! Note the idea of functionalism contained in 'organised'. Personally I see the brain as a 'mass of matter'. |
| 5054 | Animal thought is a shadow of reasoning, connecting sequences of images by imagination [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: The sequences of the brutes are but a shadow of reasoning, that is to say, they are but connexions of imagination, transitions from one image to another. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], Pref) | |
| A reaction: This account of animal thought cannot capture the fact that they are motivated by their images, and obviously make decisions based on them. Externally, there is usually an obvious reason why even an insect does something. |
| 5061 | Animals are semi-rational because they connect facts, but they don't see causes [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: There is a connexion between the perceptions of animals, which bears some resemblance to reason: but it is based only on the memory of facts or effects, and not at all on the knowledge of causes. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (Principles of Nature and Grace based on Reason [1714], §5) | |
| A reaction: This amounts to the view that animals can do Humean induction (where you see regularities), but not Leibnizian induction (where you see necessities). I say all minds perceive patterns, but only humans can think about the patterns they have perceived. |
| 5032 | It seems probable that animals have souls, but not consciousness [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: It appears probable that the brutes have souls, though they are without consciousness. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Antoine Arnauld [1686], 1686.12.08) | |
| A reaction: This will be a response to Descartes, who allowed animals sensations, but not minds or souls. Personally I cannot make head or tail of Leibniz's claim. What makes it "apparent" to him? |