display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
5 ideas
3368 | Mind is basically qualities and intentionality, but how do they connect? [Kim] |
Full Idea: It is generally held that there are two broad categories of mental phenomena - qualitative states and intentional states (but what do they have in common?). | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p. 23) | |
A reaction: I am happy to accept this orthodox modern analysis. Putting it more simply: minds exist to enable experience and thought. I judge a priori that the two aspects are not separate. Qualia exist to serve thought, and qualia are necessary for thought. |
3392 | Mind is only interesting if it has causal powers [Kim] |
Full Idea: Unless mental properties have causal powers, there would be little point in worrying about them. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.118) | |
A reaction: This doesn't, on its own, actually rule out epiphenomenalism, but it does show why it barely qualifies as a serious theory. One might, in fact, say that we simply can't worry about something which has no causal powers. The powers might not be physical… |
3396 | Experiment requires mental causation [Kim] |
Full Idea: Experimentation presupposes mental-to-physical causation and is impossible without it. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.128) | |
A reaction: So an epiphenomenalist can't do experiments? Kim implies that there is some special mental assessment of the feedback from physical events, but presumably a robot or a zombie could do experiments. Spiders do experiments. |
2318 | Agency, knowledge, reason, memory, psychology all need mental causes [Kim, by PG] |
Full Idea: The following all require a belief in mental causation: agency (mind causes events), knowledge (perception causes beliefs), reasoning (one belief causes another), memory (events cause ideas), psychology (science of mental causes). | |
From: report of Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], §2 p.031) by PG - Db (ideas) | |
A reaction: A very good list, which I cannot fault, and to which I cannot add. The question is: is there any mental activity left over which does NOT require causation? Candidates are free will, and the contingent character of qualia. I say the answer is, no. |
3397 | Beliefs cause other beliefs [Kim] |
Full Idea: A brief reflection makes it evident that most of our beliefs are generated by other beliefs we hold, and "generation" here could only mean causal generation. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.128) | |
A reaction: This seems right, and yet implies an uncomfortable determinism, as if all our beliefs just happened to us. I don't claim proper free will, but I do say there is an element in belief formation which is just caused by bunches of beliefs. Call it character. |