Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Philodemus, Bertrand Russell and Bert Leuridan

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5 ideas

15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / c. Knowing other minds

5364	It is hard not to believe that speaking humans are expressing thoughts, just as we do ourselves [Russell]
	Full Idea: When human beings speak, it is very difficult to suppose that what we hear is not the expression of a thought, as we know it would be if we emitted the same sounds.
	From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 2)
	A reaction: This is partly the 'argument from analogy', which seems a bit suspect (induction from a single instance), but it is also the rather undeniable Humean idea that we have a 'natural belief' in other minds, which we could never disbelieve.

6416	Other minds seem to exist, because their testimony supports realism about the world [Russell, by Grayling]
	Full Idea: Russell gives an argument that other minds exist, because if one is entitled to believe this, then one can rely on the testimony of others, which, jointly with one's own experience, will give powerful support to the view that there a real spatial world.
	From: report of Bertrand Russell (Our Knowledge of the External World [1914], 3) by A.C. Grayling - Russell Ch.2
	A reaction: I rather like this argument. It is quite close to Wittgenstein's Private Language Argument, which also seems to refute scepticism about other minds. I think Russell's line, using testimony, knowledge and realism, may be better than Wittgenstein's.

15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / d. Other minds by analogy

5379	If we didn't know our own minds by introspection, we couldn't know that other people have minds [Russell]
	Full Idea: But for our acquaintance with the contents of our own minds, we should be unable to imagine the minds of others, and therefore we could never arrive at the knowledge that they have minds.
	From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 5)
	A reaction: Not only does this depend on the notorious 'argument from analogy', but it actually strikes me as false. If a robot observed a human to be writhing in pain, it would be mystified, until it inferred that we have minds in which we actually 'feel' damage.

15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind

21569	It is good to generalise truths as much as possible [Russell]
	Full Idea: It is a good thing to generalise any truth as much as possible.
	From: Bertrand Russell (Philosophical Implications of Mathematical logic [1911], p.289)
	A reaction: An interesting claim, which seems to have a similar status to Ockham's Razor. Its best justification is pragmatic, and concerns strategies for coping with a big messy world. Russell's defence is in 'as much as possible'.

15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 7. Seeing Resemblance

5410	I learn the universal 'resemblance' by seeing two shades of green, and their contrast with red [Russell]
	Full Idea: If I see simultaneously two shades of green, I can see that they resemble each other, and I see that they resemble each other more than they resemble a shade of red; in this way I become acquainted with the universal 'resemblance'.
	From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch.10)
	A reaction: This is strikingly different from the account of Hume, who seemed to regard resemblance as a fairly mechanical, computer-like activity of the brain, whereas Russell (an empiricist) responds by inclining towards Platonism. Hume sounds better here.