Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Ryan Wasserman, Iris Murdoch and Kit Fine

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2 ideas

15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
If green is abstracted from a thing, it is only seen as a type if it is common to many things [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: In traditional abstraction, the colour green merely has the intrinsic property of being green, other properties of things being abstracted away. But why should that be regarded as a type? It must be because the property is common to the instances.
     From: Kit Fine (Cantorian Abstraction: Recon. and Defence [1998], §5)
     A reaction: A nice question which shows that the much-derided single act of abstraction is not sufficient to arrive at a concept, so that abstraction is a more complex matter (perhaps even a rational one) than simple empiricists believe.
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 6. Idealisation
We know perfection when we see what is imperfect [Murdoch]
     Full Idea: We know of perfection as we look upon what is imperfect.
     From: Iris Murdoch (Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals [1992], 13)
     A reaction: This is in the context of a discussion of the ontological argument for God's existence, but I seize on it as a nice expression of the idealisation capacity of our minds. The alternative is that perfection is innate idea, since we aren't seeing it.