Combining Philosophers

Ideas for William James, Keith T. Maslin and Colin McGinn

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2 ideas

15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / e. Cause of consciousness
Consciousness is not a stuff, but is explained by the relations between experiences [James]
     Full Idea: Consciousness connotes a kind of external relation, and not a special stuff or way of being. The peculiarity of our experiences, that they not only are, but are known, is best explained by their relations to one another, the relations being experiences.
     From: William James (Does Consciousness Exist? [1904], §3)
     A reaction: This view has suddenly caught people's interest. It might be better than the higher/lower relationship, which seems to leave the basic problem untouched. Does a whole network of relations between experiences gradually 'add up' to consciousness?
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 2. Unconscious Mind
If all mental life were conscious, we would be unable to see things, or to process speech [McGinn]
     Full Idea: If there were nothing more to our mind than our conscious awareness, then we would be unable to see anything or to process speech.
     From: Colin McGinn (The Making of a Philosopher [2002], Ch. 6)
     A reaction: A vital point. Traditional dualism has left us a simplistic exaggeration of the role of consciousness, and the misapprehension that most of what we do is conscious - which it clearly isn't, once you think about it.