Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Donald Davidson, Erik J. Olsson and A.J. Ayer
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10 ideas
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / a. Mind
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3960
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There are no such things as minds, but people have mental properties [Davidson]
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15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / b. Scepticism of other minds
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5177
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Other minds are 'metaphysical' objects, because I can never observe their experiences [Ayer]
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5662
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Maybe induction could never prove the existence of something unobservable [Ayer]
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8866
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If we know other minds through behaviour, but not our own, we should assume they aren't like me [Davidson]
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15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / c. Knowing other minds
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5178
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A conscious object is by definition one that behaves in a certain way, so behaviour proves consciousness [Ayer]
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5167
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The argument from analogy fails, so the best account of other minds is behaviouristic [Ayer]
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2613
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The theory of other minds has no rival [Ayer]
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5328
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Originally I combined a mentalistic view of introspection with a behaviouristic view of other minds [Ayer]
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5330
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Physicalism undercuts the other mind problem, by equating experience with 'public' brain events [Ayer]
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10346
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Knowing other minds rests on knowing both one's own mind and the external world [Davidson, by Dummett]
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