Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Donald Davidson, John Searle and Alan Musgrave
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22 ideas
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / a. Mind
3960
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There are no such things as minds, but people have mental properties [Davidson]
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15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / b. Scepticism of other minds
8866
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If we know other minds through behaviour, but not our own, we should assume they aren't like me [Davidson]
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15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / c. Knowing other minds
10346
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Knowing other minds rests on knowing both one's own mind and the external world [Davidson, by Dummett]
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3463
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We don't have a "theory" that other people have minds [Searle]
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15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / d. Other minds by analogy
3457
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Other minds are not inferred by analogy, but are our best explanation [Searle]
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15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 5. Unity of Mind
3480
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We experience unity at an instant and across time [Searle]
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5792
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Explanation of how we unify our mental stimuli into a single experience is the 'binding problem' [Searle]
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15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / a. Consciousness
5786
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A system is either conscious or it isn't, though the intensity varies a lot [Searle]
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5794
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Consciousness has a first-person ontology, which only exists from a subjective viewpoint [Searle]
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5795
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There isn't one consciousness (information-processing) which can be investigated, and another (phenomenal) which can't [Searle]
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15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / b. Essence of consciousness
3479
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The mind experiences space, but it is not experienced as spatial [Searle]
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15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / d. Purpose of consciousness
3470
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Conscious creatures seem able to discriminate better [Searle]
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15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 2. Unconscious Mind
3486
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Unconscious thoughts are those capable of causing conscious ones [Searle]
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3503
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Consciousness results directly from brain processes, not from some intermediary like information [Searle]
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15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / a. Nature of intentionality
3465
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Either there is intrinsic intentionality, or everything has it [Searle]
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3484
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Water flowing downhill can be described as if it had intentionality [Searle]
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3489
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Intentional phenomena only make sense within a background [Searle]
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15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
3494
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Intentionality is defined in terms of representation [Searle]
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3481
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Consciousness is essential and basic to intentionality [Searle]
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15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / a. Nature of qualia
5788
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The use of 'qualia' seems to imply that consciousness and qualia are separate [Searle]
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15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / b. Qualia and intentionality
4088
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Pain is not intentional, because it does not represent anything beyond itself [Searle]
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15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
19169
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Predicates are a source of generality in sentences [Davidson]
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