Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Jerry A. Fodor, Ludwig Wittgenstein and Nicolas Malebranche
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19 ideas
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / b. Purpose of mind
2508
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The function of a mind is obvious [Fodor]
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2503
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Empirical approaches see mind connections as mirrors/maps of reality [Fodor]
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15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / c. Features of mind
12636
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Mental states have causal powers [Fodor]
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15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / e. Questions about mind
2994
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In CRTT thought may be represented, content must be [Fodor]
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2443
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I say psychology is intentional, semantics is informational, and thinking is computation [Fodor]
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15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / c. Knowing other minds
19273
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I don't have the opinion that people have minds; I just treat them as such [Wittgenstein]
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15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / d. Other minds by analogy
5663
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It is irresponsible to generalise from my own case of pain to other people's [Wittgenstein]
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19272
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To imagine another's pain by my own, I must imagine a pain I don't feel, by one I do feel [Wittgenstein]
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15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / f. Higher-order thought
2453
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We are probably the only creatures that can think about our own thoughts [Fodor]
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15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 3. Privacy
4161
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If a lion could talk, we could not understand him [Wittgenstein]
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7392
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If a lion could talk, it would be nothing like other lions [Dennett on Wittgenstein]
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15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / a. Nature of intentionality
15473
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How does anything get outside itself? [Fodor, by Martin,CB]
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2485
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Do intentional states explain our behaviour? [Fodor]
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15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
2981
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Is intentionality outwardly folk psychology, inwardly mentalese? [Lyons on Fodor]
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15494
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We can't use propositions to explain intentional attitudes, because they would need explaining [Fodor]
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7326
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Intentionality doesn't go deep enough to appear on the physicists' ultimate list of things [Fodor]
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3976
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Intentional science needs objects with semantic and causal properties, and which obey laws [Fodor]
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3980
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Intentional states and processes may be causal relations among mental symbols [Fodor]
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15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 7. Seeing Resemblance
12661
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The different types of resemblance don't resemble one another [Fodor]
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