Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Peter Geach, Hesiod and Tim Crane
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10 ideas
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / e. Cause of consciousness
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4092
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The core of the consciousness problem is the case of Mary, zombies, and the Hard Question [Crane]
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15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / a. Nature of intentionality
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4087
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Intentionalism does not require that all mental states be propositional attitudes [Crane]
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4095
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Object-directed attitudes like love are just as significant as propositional attitudes [Crane]
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15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / a. Nature of qualia
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4106
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If someone removes their glasses the content of experience remains, but the quality changes [Crane]
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15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / b. Qualia and intentionality
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4089
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Pains have a region of the body as their intentional content, not some pain object [Crane]
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15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / c. Explaining qualia
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4090
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Weak intentionalism says qualia are extra properties; strong intentionalism says they are intentional [Crane]
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15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 6. Inverted Qualia
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4107
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With inverted qualia a person's experiences would change, but their beliefs remain the same [Crane]
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15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
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8775
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A big flea is a small animal, so 'big' and 'small' cannot be acquired by abstraction [Geach]
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8776
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We cannot learn relations by abstraction, because their converse must be learned too [Geach]
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15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
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10732
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If concepts are just recognitional, then general judgements would be impossible [Geach]
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