Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Proclus, A.J. Ayer and Robert Kirk
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10 ideas
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / b. Scepticism of other minds
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5177
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Other minds are 'metaphysical' objects, because I can never observe their experiences [Ayer]
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5662
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Maybe induction could never prove the existence of something unobservable [Ayer]
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15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / c. Knowing other minds
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5178
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A conscious object is by definition one that behaves in a certain way, so behaviour proves consciousness [Ayer]
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5167
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The argument from analogy fails, so the best account of other minds is behaviouristic [Ayer]
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2613
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The theory of other minds has no rival [Ayer]
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5328
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Originally I combined a mentalistic view of introspection with a behaviouristic view of other minds [Ayer]
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5330
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Physicalism undercuts the other mind problem, by equating experience with 'public' brain events [Ayer]
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15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / c. Parts of consciousness
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5001
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Maybe we should see intentionality and consciousness as a single problem, not two [Kirk,R]
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15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / a. Nature of intentionality
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4993
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If a bird captures a worm, we could say its behaviour is 'about' the worm [Kirk,R]
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15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
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5000
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Behaviourism says intentionality is an external relation; language of thought says it's internal [Kirk,R]
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