Combining Philosophers

Ideas for H.Putnam/P.Oppenheim, Franz Brentano and Ludwig Wittgenstein

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2 ideas

16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self
The philosophical I is the metaphysical subject, the limit - not a part of the world [Wittgenstein]
     Full Idea: The philosophical I is not the man, not the human body, or the human soul of wh9ch psychology treats, but the metaphysical subject, the limit - not a part of the world.
     From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Notebooks 1914-1916 [1915], 1916. 2 Sep), quoted by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 58 Intro
     A reaction: This is to treat the self as a phenomenon of thought, rather than of a human being. So if a machine could think, would it hence necessarily have a metaphysical self?
The subject stands outside our understanding of the world [Wittgenstein]
     Full Idea: The subject does not belong to the world; rather, it is a limit of the world.
     From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus [1921], 5.632)
     A reaction: Interesting. We must not confuse epistemology with ontology, but the perceived world exists between two limits - the farthest reaches of my perceptions, and the farthest reaches of myself. I wish I could clearly disentangle the nearer border. Dasein?